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The purpose of this thesis is to observe the budgeting practices of the government 
in funding contingency operations to determine to what extent a policy-maker’s actions 
result in compromises among the sound public budgeting principles. To accomplish the 
objective, this thesis evaluates the evolution of budgeting practices used in funding 
overseas contingency operations from 2001 to 2016 and determines the level of 
application of the sound budgeting principles to the budgeting practices. To illustrate the 
application of use, this thesis first defines the principles of sound public budgeting and 
maps the differing budgeting practices to the characteristics along a relative spectrum of 
high, medium, and low to determine if there are discernible patterns. A framework does 
not exist for Congress to fund for contingencies; policy-makers must therefore use 
budgeting practices that are less than ideal. Since the attacks of 9/11, the United States 
has funded contingency operations through processes different from normal budgeting. 
Over the last 15 years, those budgeting practices have evolved in a manner that questions 
to what extent funding for contingency operations is consistent with the principles of 
sound public budgeting. An analysis shows that compromises are made among the 
principles to adequately fund for contingency operations. 
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Since the day after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States 
has funded contingency operations through processes different from normal budgeting 
practices, and in addition to the base budget for defense. There are compromises that 
exist between sound, effective budgeting and supporting military contingency operations, 
for both the legislatures and the policy-makers. Supporters claim that the various 
practices over time are necessary to achieve success in the military contingency 
operations that support the War on Terror. And critics refer to the contingency operations 
funds as a “slush fund” that allows Congress to circumvent governing budgeting rules, 
which do not include budgeting for contingencies. This thesis examined the manner in 
which contingency operations are budgeted for and appropriated, with regard to the 
principles of sound public budgeting, between Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 and FY16. The 
goal of this research was to determine, through an objective evaluation of the different 
characteristics of budgeting practices, to what extent funding for contingency operations 
is consistent with the principles of sound public budgeting. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Budgeting practices in both the Pentagon and Congress have evolved over the 
years as both organizations have at times sought flexibility to support the military 
mission, and the discipline to maintain the integrity of the budgeting process. Changes in 
priorities may have resulted in processes that are less than ideal.  
According to the Public Expenditure Management Handbook, budgeting serves 
multiple purposes, requiring that budget reform be an ongoing task within the 
government (World Bank, 1998). With an overarching focus on ensuring public resources 
are planned, managed, and applied effectively, there are 10 principles of sound public 
budgeting that policy-makers should strive to attain in budget formulation, execution, and 
implementation to ensure the budgeting practices meet the expectations of sound 
budgeting today and in the future. 
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While all the principles listed in the Public Expenditure Management Handbook 
are imperative to effective budgeting, during the previous two administrations, policy-
makers have exhibited practices that lack the quality characteristics of sound public 
budgeting regarding funding for contingency operations. The principle of discipline 
ensures that the budget utilizes only the necessary resources, while flexibility focuses on 
using all the relevant information available to determine who is authorized to make 
decisions about resource allocation. The principle of legitimacy deals with decisions 
during budget formulation that affect policy; it ensures that the decisions made 
throughout the process are the “best.” Honesty is integral to the process; it ensures that 
the budget is a result of unbiased decision making and is coupled with transparency to 
ensure that the results of the budget are accessible and comprehensible, and clearly 
communicated to the public. Lastly, accountability holds policy-makers responsible for 
the decisions that they make during the process. Among these principles, there are 
compromises that exist to achieve the political objectives of Congress. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to observe the way that the president, Congress, 
and federal agencies handle funding contingency operations and to evaluate their 
budgeting practices compared to the principles of sound public budgeting. The research 
draws conclusions about the extent to which policy-makers’ actions resulted in 
compromises among sound public budgeting principles with an eye toward making 
recommendations for improvement.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following is the primary research question: 
1. As budgeting and appropriation practices for contingency operations 
evolved, to what extent were they consistent with the principles of sound 
public budgeting?  
To answer the primary question, there are four secondary questions: 
2. What are the principles for sound public budgeting? 
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3. What does the literature say about sound budgeting principles in the 
context of contingency funding and defense funding?  
4. How have the practices for budgeting for contingency operations in both 
the executive and legislature evolved between FY01–FY16?   
5. When those practices changed, did policy-makers rationalize the change in 
terms of the principles, and were expectations met?  
D. SCOPE 
The thesis covers contingency funding from FY01 through FY16. Data sources 
include Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports on the overseas contingency 
operations funding, budget estimates for each year from FY01 to FY16, historical tables 
of the U.S. budget, scholarly reports on defense budgeting, articles on the overseas 
contingency operations fund, and literature on the public budgeting system. I define the 
principles of sound budgeting and characterize these principles on a relative spectrum to 
portray how policy-makers have rationalized the changes in terms from FY01 to FY16. I 
examine how budgeting practices have evolved over the years, through supplemental 
appropriations over time using the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF), Iraqi 
Freedom Fund (IFF), Global War on Terror (GWOT) appropriation, and the Overseas 
Contingency Operations (OCO) appropriation. I determine which rules have changed to 
support the principles of sound budgeting and their impact on future supplemental 
appropriation bills for contingency operations.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This research was qualitative and followed the theory of Pattern Matching, as 
introduced by Robert K. Yin (2003) in Case Study Research, compared an empirically 
based theory with a predicted one to determine a pattern that strengthened the internal 
validity that the principles of sound budgeting were used along a spectrum to achieve 
trade-offs in public budgeting. This method involved linking two patterns where one was 
theoretical and the other was observed or operational. This method included the 
following steps: 
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1. Using what the literature on public budgeting says ought to happen in the 
budget processes, form a theory of ideal contingency budgeting practices. 
Describing those practices using the characteristics of effective budgeting. 
2. Using archival data, describe the budgeting processes for contingencies 
from FY01 to FY16, focusing on significant changes in budget practices 
and, where available, the motivations for those changes.  
3. Comparing the actual practices with ideal practices. Describing the actual 
practices using the characteristics of effective budgeting. 
4. Mapping the differing practices to the characteristics of sound public 
budgeting and determine whether there are discernible patterns. 
5. Formalizing a theory about the extent to which actual budget practices 
match the ideal and how changes in budget practices resulted in 
compromises among the characteristics of effective budgeting.  
A literature review introduced the public budgeting processes within the U.S. 
government, discussed contingency budgeting regarding funding contingency operations 
overseas in support of military operations between 2001 and 2016 and defined the 
principles of sound public budgeting within an effective budgeting system process.  
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provides an overview, the background information of this thesis, its 
purpose, and the scope of the research. Chapter II reviews contingency budgeting in the 
United States, defines the principles of sound public budgeting, and describes what is 
supposed to happen during the budgeting process both in a normal situation and in the 
case of an emergency. Chapter III reviews historical events from FY01 to FY16 focusing 
on the significant changes in budgeting practices and the motivations behind those 
changes. Chapter IV provides an evaluation of contingency budgeting practices by using 
the principles of sound public budgeting and presents a comparative analysis and 
discussion of the extent to which contingency operations are budgeted for and 
appropriated. Chapter V provides a conclusion to the extent that budgeting practices have 
evolved over the years because of compromises made to the sound budgeting principles. 
It also offers a recommendation for budgeting for contingencies while maintaining 
integrity in the budgeting system using the principles of sound budgeting, based on the 
lessons learned between 2001 and 2016.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The goal of this chapter is to conduct a critical analysis of data sources such as 
CRS reports, literature on the budgeting system, the U.S. budget, scholarly reports, and 
other articles on budgeting for overseas contingency operations to define what ought to 
happen in the budget process when budgeting for contingency operations. From the 
literature, a set of ideal budgeting practices form a baseline to use for comparison. Once 
established, the ideal budgeting practices are described using the characteristics of 
effective budgeting. 
A. THE BUDGET PROCESS 
There are three interrelated phases of the budget process: formulation of the 
President’s Budget (PB), Congressional actions, and the execution of the enacted budget 
and laws. The budget system is a framework designed to allow the U.S. government a 
means to decide how much and what to spend the country’s resources on (OMB, 2016, p. 
97). Ideally, it allows decision-makers the ability to use the best relevant information 
available in order to allocate resources in the most efficient way possible to achieve some 
specified political objective or goal (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], 2014). Through the budgeting system, financial resources are 
translated into human purposes and allocated through a central policy document that is 
called a budget (Wildavsky, 1975, p. 3). The budget is the principal tool for employing 
fiscal policy and influencing the economy. Essentially, it is a contract between the 
government and its citizens that determines how resources are allocated (OECD, 
2014, p. 1). 
1. Formulation of the President’s Budget 
Through the budget, the president sets forth fiscal policy objectives to illustrate 
how the government plans to prioritize and achieve specific objectives through resource 
allocation. The primary focus of the budget is on the allocation of resources for the 
current budget year (OMB, 2016, p. 97). A budget year is a “term used in the budget 
formulation process to refer to the fiscal year” in which Congress is considering the 
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budget (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005, p. 55). In a normal year, the 
process begins in spring with the president establishing a budget based on specific policy 
guidelines. The president, along with other executive officials and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), reviews proposals and evaluations on current policy, 
previously enacted budgets, and reactions from the last proposed budget to make 
decisions on the current budget year proposal. Based on the guidelines set by the 
president, guidelines specific to the policy are created by the OMB along with the federal 
agencies to guide the budget request for the budget year. Once the guidelines are 
established, agencies submit their budget requests to the OMB for review. By late 
December, the decision-making process is complete and the budget preparation process 
begins with developing detailed budget data based on the effects of economic outlooks on 
the budget estimates (e.g., interest rates, economic growth, and inflation). This is done 
concurrently with considering the needs of available resources for each program and the 
allocation of those resources among the federal agencies (OMB, 2016, pp. 97–98). The 
process concludes when the president sends his proposal to Congress, which is due by the 
first Monday of February, to allow time for Congressional action.  
To carry out the requirements of the Constitution, the president must consider 
Chapter 11 of Title 31, United States Code and the Budget and Accounting Act (1921), 
which established the framework for federal budgeting. These laws provide the president 
with procedures for submitting his budget proposal; entail the information required to be 
contained therein; describe the congressional budget process and the controls for certain 
aspects of budget execution; and delineate the budget treatment for federal credit 
programs (OMB, 2016, pp. 97–115). Additionally, the president must consider budget 
enforcement laws such as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
(BBEDCA) of 1985, which initially established limits on discretionary spending and 
provided enforcement mechanisms for control (OMB, 2016, p. 115). Since then, the 
Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) amended the BBEDCA and reinstated the limits to 
the amount of discretionary budget authority allowed by Congress and discretionary 
spending for defense and non-defense categories (White House, 2016, p. 3). During this 
process, decision-makers assist the president in developing a budget by considering the 
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effects of economic factors, the annual and multi-annual request for program funding and 
program requirements, departmental budget requests, and the total current outlays and 
receipts (OMB, 2016, pp. 97–98). During a normal budget year, the budget calendar 
depicts the significant budget events and the scheduled dates for completion for each 
action item (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Budget Calendar for a Normal Budget Year. Source: 
OMB (2014, p. 99). 
For defense budgeting, the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 
(PPBE) process determines how the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) allocates its 
resources for manning, training, and equipping the military to support the national 
security objectives while also supporting the military’s operational plans. Annually, the 
military service chiefs submit a program objective memorandum (POM) to the secretary 
of defense (SECDEF) outlining resource limitations across a five-year period. The PPBE 
system is designed to link defense strategic planning to programs that will best achieve 
that strategy, within the limitations of the budget document. Once the budget document is 
prepared, it is submitted to the Congress for authorization and appropriation 
(Congressional Research Service, 2016). 
2. Congressional Actions 
When Congress receives the president’s budget proposal, its focus is to create a 
single budget resolution (BR) which represents both the House and the Senate (OMB, 
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2016, p. 98). The House and the Senate are required to resolve any differences regarding 
the budget and adopt a single BR by April 15 of the budget year (OMB, 2016, p. 98). The 
BR sets limits on the amount of budget authority (BA), “the authority required to incur 
financial obligations that will result in expenditures,” which the appropriations can 
provide to governmental agencies and/or departments and which specifies a purpose for 
which the appropriation can be used (OMB, 2016, p. 98). Through spending legislation, 
Congress can change funding levels, eliminate or add programs, and make other changes. 
The goal of the BR is to set targets for total outlays and total receipts, budget authority, 
and budget deficit/surplus (OMB, 2016, p. 98). The authorization-appropriation process 
is an annual funding process used by Congress to fund the federal government. 
Theoretically, the Congress is supposed to create a new budget for each budget year, and 
in addition, must pass legislation that provides the legal authority to expend resources 
(OMB, 2016, p. 98).  
An authorization bill can establish, continue, or modify agencies or programs and 
it allocates federally appropriated funds to new or existing programs (Saturno, Heniff, & 
Lynch, 2016). It is a legislative provision that establishes rules for the programs, sets the 
details, and permits funding, but does not actually provide funding (United States Senate, 
n.d.). Programs are authorized based on a time period; usually an authorization may be in 
effect for one-year, a fixed number of years, or an indefinite period (OMB, 2016, p. 98). 
Although it is ideal to have an authorization followed by an appropriation, Congress is 
not required to fund a program once it has been authorized. Similarly, Congress does not 
need an authorization for a program in order to enact an appropriation (United States 
Senate, n.d.). 
An appropriation is the provision of budget authority that provides the actual 
resources to execute the specific federal programs which have been authorized (United 
States Senate, n.d.). There are three types of appropriation bills: regular, continuing, and 
supplemental. Regular appropriations are passed annually and provide the majority of the 
funding for the fiscal year to fund the routine activities of most federal agencies (Saturno 
et al., 2016). Usually, 12 regular appropriations bill are scheduled to be enacted by 
October 1 of each year to fund these programs (OMB, 2016). However, Congress has not 
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been able to enact all 12 regular appropriation bills by the deadline for any year between 
2001 and 2016 (Saturno & Tollestrup, 2016). In the case that the regular appropriation 
bills are not enacted on time, Congress appropriates a continuing appropriation to 
continue operations until a regular appropriation is enacted, also known as a continuing 
resolution (CR; United States Senate, n.d.). 
A supplemental appropriation provides funding in addition to regular 
appropriations. It provides budget authority generally to cover emergencies or other 
exceptional circumstances that cannot wait until the enactment of the next regular 
appropriation (United States Senate, n.d.). Congress often considers more than one 
supplemental appropriation measure at a time. Concurrently, with a regular appropriation 
or a continuing appropriation, Congress has previously included supplemental 
appropriations (Saturno et al., 2016). In normal situations, supplemental appropriations 
are governed by the same budget enforcement rules as regular appropriations. 
3. Budget Execution 
After Congress enacts the appropriation, resources are released to the 
corresponding agencies/departments for which the resources were allocated as per the 
approved budget. Once the resources are dispersed, government agencies execute the 
budget (OMB, 2016). The budget execution process includes monitoring, tracking, and 
adjusting the allocated resources according to spending patterns. The process requires 
that agencies and departments monitor their spending patterns, spending to date, and 
spending projections for the remainder of the year (OMB, 2016, p. 103). Additionally, 
agencies must track obligated funds during the specified period in which funds were 
appropriated to ensure spending is in accordance with the guidelines of the approved 
budget. To obligate funds means to place an order, award a contract, or receive service(s) 
(United States Senate, n.d.).  
During the budget execution phase, budget adjustments are made to resolve 
overspending or prevent agencies from losing budget authority during the specified time 
frame (Office of the Chief Financial Officer, 2017). Conversely, governmental agencies 
may find the appropriation by Congress insufficient to fulfill the requirements of the 
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fiscal year due to unanticipated or exceptional circumstances (OMB, 2016). The budget 
execution process is governed by the Antideficiency Act (ADA), which prohibits 
spending in advance of an appropriation or in excess of the appropriation amount 
allocated by Congress. Therefore, federal agencies and departments must use the funds 
for the specific purpose(s) which Congress approved (OMB, 2016, p. 103). Historically, 
the government limits the use of resources, except in cases of extreme emergencies or 
special circumstances under which Congress may enact a supplemental appropriation 
(Candreva, 2017).  
B. BUDGETING FOR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
Sometimes there are exceptional circumstances, called contingencies. As defined 
by Title 10-Armed Forces U.S.C § 101 (1956), a “contingency operation” involves 
military action, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States, which 
involve members of the armed forces or any operation that “results in the call or order to, 
or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services … during a war or 
during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.” Recent examples of 
contingency operations include the war-related activities and operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq in support of the Global War on Terror because of the attacks on the United 
States in 2001. Contingency operations sometimes call for an increase in defense 
spending, causing funding requirements to exceed what was anticipated; therefore, 
funding contingencies require a deviation from normal budgeting practices. In these 
cases, the executive administration will submit a supplemental request for additional 
funding to augment the base budget in order to meet the unanticipated need(s) of the 
contingency (Williams & Epstein, 2017).  
1. Deviations from Normal Budgeting 
Congress, along with the DOD, develops an annual defense budget for 
discretionary spending, which does not allocate adequate funding for conducting military 
contingency operations overseas. Special circumstances such as contingency operations 
that require the involvement of U.S. military forces in wartime activities are not normally 
budgeted for and require emergency supplemental funding (Under Secretary of Defense 
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[USD], 2009, pp. 5–6). The Financial Management Regulation (FMR) states, “DOD 
Components must accomplish directed contingency operations using funds available to 
the cognizant command or unit, independent of the receipt of specific funds for the 
operations” (USD, 2009, p. 5). Though funding for ongoing military contingency 
operations has been funded for through regular appropriations with partial or limited cost 
projections, contingency operations are typically budgeted for and appropriated using 
supplemental appropriations that have an “emergency” or “Overseas Contingency 
Operations/Global War on Terror (OCO/GWOT)” designation (Williams & Epstein, 
2017). The BBEDCA (1985) defines an “emergency” as a situation that is “sudden … 
urgent … unforeseen … temporary,” and requires a supplemental appropriation. 
Correspondingly, a supplemental appropriation provides additional funding for 
unforeseen needs (Saturno et al., 2016). However, the terms supplemental, emergency, 
and contingency operations are not interchangeable but often overlap. For example, 
supplemental appropriations sometimes fund contingency operations that are designated 
as emergencies but not all contingency operations are deemed an “emergency.” 
Supplemental appropriations also fund non-emergency situations such as disaster relief 
(Candreva, 2017, p. 14). In addition, deviations can include appropriations in lump sum 
amounts provided by Congress in special accounts (Williams & Epstein, 2017). Those 
special accounts are like an emergency transfer account; one type of special account is 
the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF), which is an account specified to use in 
the case of “emergencies.” Emergencies designated by Congress and the president are 
thereby exempt from procedural budget enforcement mechanisms (BBEDCA, 2015). 
2. Budget Enforcement 
The federal government uses budget enforcement mechanisms to control 
revenues, spending, and deficits. Currently, the primary enforcement mechanism that 
affects budgeting for contingencies is the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; OMB, 
2016). As previously mentioned, the BCA amended the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA) by reinstating “spending caps” on the amount 
that the government can provide in the appropriation for discretionary spending. The 
budget authority is classified as either “mandatory” or “discretionary” in the 
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appropriation to indicate how the budget authority is controlled. Usually, if the budget 
authority is provided for through an annual appropriation, then the budget authority is 
considered discretionary; if the budget authority is provided for through authorizing 
legislation, the budget authority is mandatory (OMB, 2016, p. 109). Most federal 
programs such as defense, education, and transportation programs are funded using 
discretionary funds and thus are subject to budget enforcement rules, while; entitlement 
programs such as Social Security and Medicare are mandatory spending because they are 
benefit programs for which the federal government has a legal obligation to pay those 
who meet the criteria of eligibility to receive payment and which are not subject to 
budget enforcement rules (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-b).  
The BBEDCA requires the OMB to calculate the total sum of the appropriation 
bills each year and report if any appropriation for “discretionary spending is enacted in 
excess of the statutory limits” of the budget caps (Saturno et al., 2016, p. 15). The BCA 
of 2011 states that if an appropriation is enacted in excess to the spending limit, a process 
called “sequestration” occurs in accordance with the guidelines stipulated in the BCA. 
Budget sequestration was first authorized by the BBEDCA, but sequestrations still trigger 
automatic across-the-board cuts to discretionary spending in the same way. In addition, to 
deficit control enforcement, all legislation formulated during the budget process is subject 
to a set of budget enforcement rules that are associated with the Budgeting and 
Accounting Act of 1921, the BBEDCA, and the Antideficiency Act, as well as the 
additional limitations set by the BCA (Candreva, 2017; Williams & Epstein, 2017). 
Because there is no enforcement (other than political will) of the definition of an 
“emergency,” if Congress wishes to increase the spending above the caps to avoid the 
sequestration process, it could simply deem the additional spending an “emergency.”  
C. PRINCIPLES OF SOUND PUBLIC BUDGETING 
Government budgets have been described as a form of social and legal contract 
between the branches of government, and between the government and the citizens 
(Wildavsky & Caiden, 2001). A contract is a set of mutual promises or an agreement 
between parties that each will do something. In a budget, the executive branch essentially 
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promises to execute the programs that are proposed, and the Congress agrees to fund 
those programs. Sound public budgeting ensures that the expectations of the citizens for 
those programmatic outcomes are made explicit through legislation (OECD, 2014). As a 
contract between the government and the citizens, there is an expectation that the budget 
be comprehensive, accurate, and reliable. The objective is to strive for good governance 
through a budgetary process that considers and funds policy proposals, while serving as a 
basis of accountability. It is understandable that contingencies could alter a carefully 
considered plan. The World Bank’s Public Expenditure Management Handbook (1998) 
describes 10 characteristics of effective public budgeting. Those characteristics are in 
italic font and discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Comprehensive and disciplined describe the fact that all spending is captured in 
the budget, and that those involved in the budgeting process will follow the established 
processes and rules. Discipline is needed not only in moving through the critical steps of 
the bureaucratic processes, but also includes staying within revenue and expense limits. 
Budgets should not overcommit resources, and policy-makers must take into 
consideration the future resourcing needs when making decisions (World Bank, 1998). 
Defense-related examples of a lack of comprehensiveness can be found in the budgets for 
classified programs. In some cases, those programs are presented as aggregates with no 
information about their content; in other cases, only the title of the program is provided 
(an unclassified code word) but the program description is blank in the budget 
(Candreva, 2017). A lack of process discipline can be seen when a BR is not passed or an 
appropriation bill is not completed by the start of a fiscal year. Missing a deficit reduction 
target is evidence of a lack of discipline in the amount of spending.  
Legitimacy plays an integral role in ensuring that policy-makers implement the 
budget appropriately by involving them in the formulation of that budget (World Bank, 
1998). In a defense setting, legitimacy is obtained by having the service secretaries, other 
political appointees, service chiefs, and other senior officers brief the budget and testify 
about the policies and programs that the budget would fund. It also includes the 
professional staff of the congressional defense committees to seek feedback from the 
DOD when the DOD proposes a change to the budget. In a contingency environment, 
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those responsible for addressing the contingency should have significant input on the 
budget. For the DOD, that would mean input from the combatant commanders in charge 
of that geographic area (e.g., CentCom for the Middle East) or strategic capability (e.g., 
SpecOps). 
Flexibility is about allocating decision rights on spending to the level most 
appropriate based on where the best information is located. In a routine environment, this 
would mean that managerial decisions should be made by those who implement policy 
and policy decisions should be made by the senior civilian and military leadership (World 
Bank, 1998). In a contingency environment, flexibility is crucial in the early stages of the 
crisis, which, is also the time when information is widely dispersed. This would suggest 
that the legislature or military leadership should not overly prescribe how the funds 
should be spent, but would require more delegation authority than usual. Funds required 
when responding to the emergency either must be in a pre-existing emergency transfer 
account that is accessible only under specific rules, or must be rapidly appropriated 
through a supplemental appropriation bill.  
Predictability is about policy-makers knowing the needs of the program and the 
resource flow for which they are funding. The information policy-makers use to 
implement policies and programs in balancing the short-term with the long-term budget 
requirements is crucial for effective and efficient policy implementation. The budget 
should be predictable in terms of money, time, and need to adequately fund programs 
appropriately, in a timely manner (World Bank, 1998). The budget process includes 
developing detailed data based on assumptions that stem from predictions based on past 
occurrences. For example, assumptions are based on previously enacted appropriations, 
budget events which are reoccurring, long-standing programs, economic history, history 
of government spending and revenue, and other considerations. The restraint of 
predictability throughout the budget process that is placed upon policy-makers ensures 
that the decisions regarding funding existing government programs are made in a timely 
fashion. This allows policy-makers adequate time to manage resources more efficiently 
and to plan funding for approved policies/programs within the time frame of the annual 
budget cycle. In addition, there is an inherent component of predictability in the budget 
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process; the budget timeline is outlined through a very specific order of scheduled budget 
events depicted through a detailed budget calendar. Accordingly, predictability is about 
balancing the needs of future based upon the details of the past, and doing so in a timely 
manner. In the case of responding to emergencies, predictability does not apply, as 
emergencies are considered as unforeseen events for which there is not necessarily an 
established precedent and which, therefore, may not be able to be handled in a predictable 
manner. Emergencies are inherently unpredictable and require that needs be met 
according to last minute requests. Unpredictability of funding weakens the operational 
performance of the budget and lessens the legitimacy of policy changes resulting from 
last minute changes. 
Contestability ensures continual improvement to existing policy’s performance 
through review and evaluation. Therefore, a careful balance between the two must exist 
(World Bank, 1998). Policy-makers, Congress, other government officials, and the 
federal agencies all have a duty to provide “checks and balances” throughout the budget 
process. One example is the relationship between the executive branch and Congress 
during the budget process; the president creates a budget proposal and transmits it to 
Congress which then will, with the secretaries of the departments along with the OMB, 
review the budget proposal before completing the decision-making process and readying 
the budget for final approval and execution (OMB, 2016, pp. 97–99). Contest participants 
do not apply only to actors of the budget process; but, also to the terms. The separation of 
discretionary spending and mandatory spending, its implementation in the budget, and 
the execution by the federal agencies are all dependent upon careful review and 
evaluation of current and past policies. During the execution phase contestability plays a 
huge role in the affiliation of laws imposed by Congress on how the government agencies 
may or may not spend or obligate an appropriation (OMB, 2016, p. 103). For example, 
asking for funds for an unauthorized program may challenge the principle of 
contestability. For the DOD and the services, contestability of information ensures that 
implemented policies are continually improving to reflect the evolving nature of military 
activities. Decision-makers may be unable to effectively set policy priorities without an 
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evaluation of the policies and improving the criteria to support higher performance 
capability (GAO, 2017). 
An honest budget process requires unbiased projections about both revenue and 
expenditures; it is vital to a successful implementation of the government’s priorities 
where sources of bias can come from political objectives and influence national policy 
(World Bank, 1998). The budget is comprised of projections made by decision-makers 
about the effects of various economic and technical assumptions, which can alter budget 
estimates by billions of dollars with the slightest change in an assumption (OMB, 2016, 
p. 98). In the time of an emergency, policy-makers cannot formulate an honest budget 
due to a lack of knowledge of the details of the emergency; therefore, decision-makers in 
government may be motivated to introduce biased projections. For example, to avoid cuts 
to costly programs, decision-makers may only highlight economic growth (Krol, 2014, p. 
99). Optimistic projections can soften the budget and affect strategic priorities setting, 
which can lead to policy-makers implementing and executing the policy priorities 
ineffectively and inefficiently (World Bank, 1998).   
Accurate information on costs, outputs, and outcomes reinforces honest 
projections from policy-makers in the form of reliability throughout the decision-making 
process. It is necessary to have accurate, relevant, and timely information to make 
unbiased projections on costs (World Bank, 1998). Clear factual reports should include 
all budgetary information relevant to make sound decisions (including the full financial 
costs and benefits of the budget decisions, and the impacts thereof) and be made 
accessible to all government participants for review (OECD, 2014). Normally, a fully 
published budget document includes all necessary and relevant budget data and is 
presented in a clear and timely manner. When budgeting for contingencies and/or 
emergencies, there are problems with the quality of information given with the budget 
request by the services, and the cost information associated with contingency operations 
can sometimes be lacking due to the restriction of details related to the military 
operations. Programs that are funded through non-traditional means like supplemental 
appropriations should be fully explained in the framework of the budget document 
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(OECD, 2014). Improperly defined costs associated with military operations may cause 
policy-makers to appropriate funds improperly. 
Transparency and accountability deal with the accessibility of all relevant 
information within the budget document. It must clearly communicate to the government 
and citizens alike which priorities policy-makers considered during budget formulation, 
what information was relied upon to make decisions, and the results of their cost 
projections (World Bank, 1998). Transparency demands that the information used in the 
budget be published to the public. Accountability entails that the decision-makers are 
held responsible for their decisions and thus are held responsible for programmatic 
outcomes (World Bank, 1998). Budget execution reports are essential to accountability; 
the report includes in-year and year-end information on program performance and value-
for-money information for future budget allocation decisions. During the normal budget 
year, Congress has the time to hold forums to facilitate an effective discussion on policy 
choices. During this deliberation, there are a lot of details in the budget and 
appropriations bills to determine policy guidelines; hence, accountability can be placed 
on policy-makers’ ex ante (OECD, 2014). In an emergency, information may be 
classified, unknown, or underdeveloped, and cost projections may be undetermined. 
When details are lacking, policy-makers must make hasty policy decisions and 
accountability can occur only after the fact. 
A sound budgeting system focuses on stimulating the trust between the 
government and the people by creating a plan that is likely to be implemented. It aims to 
achieve legitimate objectives, through means based on good information, and to 
effectively use no more than the available resources. The budgeting process should 
incorporate all levels of the government through a comprehensible, consistent, and 
coordinated effort (OECD, 2014). Although budgeting practices vary, the principles of 
sound public budgeting are a guide to achieve the main objective. The intent of the 
principles should be implemented throughout the entire budgetary process to meet the 
expectations of policy-makers (World Bank, 1998).  
When faced with a contingency, that ideal environment no longer exists. 
Information is incomplete and dispersed. Funding cannot wait for months- or years-long 
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routine processes because an immediate release of funding is necessary. An effective 
response to the exigency will demand a compromise of discipline for an increase in 
flexibility. Accountability must come after the fact rather than through ordinary ex ante 
authorization or appropriation structures. Transparency may be clouded by a fast-moving 
environment. In some ways, these ideals are compromised. Policy-makers need to 
consider in advance how those compromises should best occur through budgeting for 
contingencies.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Under routine conditions, the DOD is expected to formulate a defense budget that 
supports U.S. strategic priorities. That budget should proceed through a legitimate 
process overseen by Congress and result in authorizations and appropriations that enable, 
prescribe, and when necessary, restrain the actions of the military in achieving its 
mission. That budget, the budget process, and the associated decisions made during 
formulation and enactment should meet the ideals described in section C on principles of 
sound public budgeting. Formulating a sound public budget requires time and early 
planning. The defense budget process is approximately two years long, time that is 
usually unavailable during an emergency (OECD, 2014).  
Because of the inherent urgency of a true emergency, ideal budgeting conditions 
are not present. Information is scattered and unreliable. A response is demanded hastily, 
shortening the decision process time. The executive branch responds immediately, but 
there is little the legislature can do besides provide additional funding and authorities. 
Seeking broad input and contesting policy options would interfere with rather than 
enhance the goal. There is nothing yet to oversee or regulate. Emergency response funds 
with clear rules to access them can provide some immediate flow of funds, in the instance 
of a predictable emergency, such as weather-related natural disasters. Military 
contingencies, however, are not as common or as easily determined and are often far 
more expensive. 
Thus, the ideals of public budgeting are expected to be unattainable in a military 
emergency when flexibility and timeliness of funding is paramount and decisions 
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regarding costs are not based on reliable information. The government may choose to err 
on the high side, to ensure an effective response, compromising discipline with respect to 
deficit targets. Decision processes would be hurried, eroding legitimacy and 
contestability. Therefore, one can expect to see the legislature appropriate supplemental 
funds sufficient for the near term (less than a year) activities. One would not expect to see 
a refined budget, with amounts in the typical categories of personnel, operations and 
maintenance, and procurement, but rather an account that grants the military broader 
discretion, providing the necessary amount of flexibility.  
Should the duration of the military operations extend beyond the lead-time of the 
normal budget process, there is less need for flexibility, and one would expect to see the 
budgeting practices move closer to the ideal. Doing so, would allow more time to collect 
better information, deliberate, and follow routine processes thus having the ability to hold 
military officials accountable throughout the budget process. The legislature could, with 
more confidence, appropriate funds with more reliability into the routine accounts. 
Ideally, the concepts of emergency, contingency, and supplemental are applied as 
intended. It may even become possible to return to comprehensive budgeting with both 
the base requirements and war requirements in one appropriation as seem in previous 
eras, like the Vietnam War era. 
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III. CONTINGENCY BUDGETING BETWEEN FY01 AND FY16 
When the Twin Towers in New York City were attacked by terrorists on 
September 11, 2001, many citizens were killed, and the United States was in a state of 
grief. There was not a precedent set for budgeting and how to fund for a crisis; thus, 
policy-makers deviated from normal budgeting practices in support of the Global War on 
Terror. In response to the terrorist attacks, the military operations abroad in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were comprised of both war-related activities as well as non–war-related 
activities. Congress approved lump sums appropriations for special accounts to meet 
unanticipated wartime needs (Williams & Epstein, 2017).  
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq included five major military operations: 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS), Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation New Dawn (OND), and Operation Inherent Resolve 
(OIR; Williams & Epstein, 2017, pp. 14–15). In support of the military efforts in the 
Middle East, Congress used two types of appropriations to fund war-related and non–
war-related contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, emergency appropriations as 
well as supplemental appropriations. With the use of different labels, military operations 
conducted overseas since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, have mostly used 
supplemental appropriations to fund any overseas contingency operations under the 
designation of an “emergency.” Since 2001, there have been two defense budgets, the 
base budget and the emergency supplemental account for overseas contingency 
operations that is funded for and appropriated in parallel (Candreva, 2017). 
This chapter illustrates how contingency operations were actually funded by the 
president and the Congress between FY01 and FY16, includes a list of all contingency- 
related funding, and discusses the budgeting practices in light of that data. It focuses on 
the evolution of budgeting practices during 2001–2016 and any significant changes and 
the motivation for those changes. It highlights the use of supplemental appropriations to 
fund programs designated as an “emergency” and/or “overseas contingency operations” 
and the effects that doing so had on the budgeting process.  
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A. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BETWEEN FY01 AND FY16 
From September 2001 to December 2016, there were a total of 28 supplemental 
appropriations enacted for both war-related and non–war-related activities (Congressional 
Budget Office, n.d.-a). In addition, billions of dollars of discretionary funds were 
appropriated by Congress each year in regular appropriations to fund disaster relief and 
other emergencies related to natural disasters (Bogie, 2016).  
Immediately following the attacks of 9/11, President George W. Bush requested 
from Congress an emergency supplemental appropriation act in the amount of $20 billion 
for “Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States” 
(Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). A supplemental appropriation was necessary due 
to the extraordinary expenses; also, it was 12 days before the end of the fiscal year 
(Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a; OMB, n.d.). Congress immediately passed a $40 
billion supplemental appropriation with very little restriction of use (Candreva & Jones, 
2005, p. 6). The first supplemental appropriation was placed in the DERF, an account 
Congress specified to be used in the case of “emergencies.” The DERF was initially 
created in FY90, and it was available for Congress to reimburse the DOD for money used 
in assisting in disaster relief. But, the DERF was seldom used between 1991 and 2001 
(Candreva & Jones, 2005, p. 4). Post-9/11, Congress used the DERF account to provide 
obligation authority because it was available and a convenient way to disburse 
appropriations with little restrictions on use in times of crisis (Candreva & Jones, 2005).  
In 2002, two additional supplemental appropriations were enacted, on January 10 
and August 2, in the amount of approximately $45.3 billion total; both were for 
“Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States” (OMB, n.d.).  
The regular appropriation for FY03 was enacted in October 2002 in the amount of 
$2,159.9 billion (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). That year, there were also four 
supplemental appropriations enacted; the first was in April, in the amount of $79.2 billion 
for the “Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2003,” the second was in 
August, in the amount of $1 billion for “Emergency Supplemental Appropriation for 
Disaster Relief Act, 2003,” and the third supplemental appropriation of $0.9 billion was 
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enacted only a day before the FY04 regular appropriation enacted in the amount of 
$2,292.8 billion for “Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2004.” The last 
occurred in November in the amount of $87.6 billion for “Defense and the 
Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan” (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a; OMB, 
n.d.).  
Between FY03 and FY10, supplemental appropriations became the standard 
budgeting practice to fund the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and any 
associated military operations in support of the Global War on Terror (Candreva, 2017). 
Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Congress ceased using the DERF because 
the DOD treated DERF as a direct cite fund, where there was no distinguishability 
between appropriation accounts (e.g., no difference between funds for Operations and 
Maintenance [O&M], Military Personnel, Navy [MPN], and Procurement in place of 
funds for contingency operations). Instead, Congress created the Iraqi Freedom Fund 
(IFF) to fund contingency operations in support of the Iraqi War, stipulating that any 
remaining balance in the DERF should be transferred to and merged with the IFF 
(Young, 2003). The funds from the IFF were provided in the traditional appropriation 
accounts and transferred to the various appropriations to meet the most urgent 
requirements after enactment (Belasco, 2014). 
In August 2004, a DOD Appropriations Act in the amount of $28.2 billion was 
enacted only a month before a second Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act in the 
amount of $2 billion was enacted, and less than a month until the FY05 regular 
appropriation enacted in the amount of $2,472 billion (OMB, n.d.). Two weeks after the 
enactment of the FY05 appropriation, an Emergency Supplemental for “Hurricane 
Disaster Assistance Act, 2005” was enacted in the amount of $14.5 billion right before 
the start of the new fiscal year in response to four hurricanes striking the southeast part of 
the United States, within a six-week span, resulting in an estimated $70 billion in 
damages (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a; “2004–Hurricane Charley,” n.d.). In 
2005, the United State experienced three major hurricanes, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane 
Rita, and Hurricane Wilma, which all occurred within a 60-day period. Hurricane Katrina 
alone caused over $100 billion in damages, and it was deemed the costliest hurricane in 
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the U.S. history. Other natural disasters during that year caused over $30 billion in 
damages (Hurricanes, n.d.). During this time, over $80 billion were funded using 
supplemental appropriations, with the majority of the funds being provided for in 2005 in 
association with Hurricane Katrina and in 2008 to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), in response to the midwest flooding and hurricanes Ike and Gustav (Lindsay & 
Murray, 2014).  
It is important to highlight the number of natural disasters that occurred during 
2001– 2016 to understand the fiscal tension of the United States during that time. When a 
natural disaster is declared by the president, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) is permitted to use funds that are provided through regular annual appropriations 
to provide disaster relief. The funds are appropriated through a “no-year” account labeled 
the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which allows unused funds to be carried over; these 
funds do not expire, and any balance remaining is rolled over to the next year and can be 
used for future years (Bogie, 2016). When funds in the DRF are consumed or close to 
being depleted, the president can request a supplemental appropriation from Congress 
(Bogie, 2016). Natural disasters that do not fall under the normal non-catastrophic 
category receive supplemental appropriations; these appropriations are in addition to the 
regular annual appropriations and have practically no limit. In these cases, the president 
must first issue a formal disaster declaration before a supplemental appropriation can be 
approved (Bogie, 2016). 
There were a total of five supplemental appropriations enacted in 2005. In May, 
an “Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for the Defense, the Global War on 
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005” was enacted in the amount of $82.1 billion 
(Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). In early August, there was a supplemental 
appropriation in the amount $1.5 billion for “Department of the Interior, Environment, 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006” (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). 
In September, an Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act of $10.5 billion was 
enacted to assist in the disaster relief requirements that were identified immediately 
following Hurricane Katrina (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). The very next week 
and for the exact same reason, a second Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act, in 
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the amount of $51.8 billion, was enacted (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). The two 
emergency supplemental appropriation bills mostly funded the DRF after Hurricane 
Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast of the United States (Lindsay & Murray, 2011). In 
2005, $82 billion of supplemental appropriations was approved for wars; this included 
approximately $10 billion for non-emergency items (Weisman & Murray, 2005). In 
October 2005, the regular the FY06 appropriation in the amount of $2,655.1 billion was 
enacted (OMB, n.d.).  
In 2006, there were two supplemental appropriations, one in June in the amount 
of $94.4 billion for “Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006” 
and the second in late September in the amount of $0.2 billion for “DOD Appropriations 
Act, 2007” (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). The FY07 appropriation was enacted 
two days later in the amount of $2,728.7 billion (OMB, n.d.).  
During 2007, there was only one supplemental appropriation for a total of $120 
billion for “U.S. troop readiness, veterans’ care, Katrina recovery and Iraq accountability 
Appropriations Act, 2007” (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). Less than five months 
later the FY08 regular appropriation in the amount of $2,982.5 billion was enacted 
(OMB, n.d.).  
In 2008, there were three supplemental appropriations. The June Supplemental 
Appropriation Act, 2008 was enacted in the amount of $115.8 billion for FY08 and $85.2 
for FY09, and on the last day of FY08, a “Disaster Relief and Recovery Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 2008” was enacted in the amount of $22.9 billion (Congressional 
Budget Office, n.d.-a). The next day, the regular FY09 appropriation was enacted for 
$3,517.7 billion (OMB, n.d.).  
The next Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2009 was enacted in June 2009 in the 
amount of $105.9 billion for “spending in the Iraq War and Afghanistan War during the 
2009 fiscal year” (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a; see Figure 2). The FY10 regular 
appropriation was $3,457.1 billion enacted in October 2009 (OMB, n.d.).  
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Figure 2. DOD Appropriation Acts Enacted (2001–2008) in Addition 
to the DOD Regular Appropriation Bills. Adapted from Belasco 
(2014); Congressional Budget Office (n.d.-a). 
A new president was elected in FY09, resulting in a decrease in the use of 
supplemental appropriations to fund military operations in relation to the Global War on 
Terror. Between 2001 and 2008, there were 23 total appropriation bills enacted for 
defense in addition to the regular appropriation bills enacted during this time. Of these, 
14 were supplemental appropriations (eight that were directly related to war-related 
activities). The next Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 was enacted in July 2010 in 
the amount of $55.5 billion (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). Two weeks later, a 
supplemental appropriation was enacted for $.05 billion for “an Act making emergency 
supplemental appropriations for border security for 2010, and other purposes” (not stated) 
(Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). FY11 and FY12 were absent of any supplemental 
appropriations; the regular appropriation amounts were $3,603.1 billion and $3,537 
billion, respectively (OMB, n.d.). The FY13 appropriation was $3,454.7 billion enacted 
in October 2012, three months before the next Supplemental Appropriation for $50.5 
billion was enacted in January 2013 for disaster relief (Congressional Budget Office, 
n.d.-a; OMB, n.d.). The FY14 appropriation was $3,506.1 billion, and nine months later, 
an Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Resolution, 2014 was enacted for $0.02 
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billion (OMB, n.d.; Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a). Two months later, the FY15 
appropriation was enacted in the amount $3,688.3 billion, and then a year later the FY16 
appropriation of $3,951.3 billion was enacted (OMB, n.d.). A couple of days before the 
FY17 appropriation was enacted for $4,147.2 billion, a supplemental appropriation for 
$1.2 billion was enacted for “continuing appropriations and military construction, 
veterans’ affairs, and related agencies Appropriations Act, 2017 and Zika response and 
preparedness Act” (Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a; OMB, n.d.). The last 
supplemental appropriation of 2016 occurred in December in the amount of $10.1 billion 
for “further continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017” 
(Congressional Budget Office, n.d.-a; see Figure 3). The total amount of OCO funding 
the DOD received since the September 11, 2001 attacks, exceeds $1.6 trillion (see 
Figure 4). Between 2009 and 2016, there were only 11 total supplemental appropriation 
bills enacted in addition to the regular appropriation bills enacted during this time. From 
2001–2009, a total of $573.9 billion was provided for in supplemental appropriation 
budget authority for Defense compared to $119.5 between 2009 and 2016. Of the total 
amount of $693.5 of supplemental appropriation bills enacted, there was an approximate 
80% decrease in the use of supplemental appropriations during 2009–2016 (numbers do 
not add up due to rounding) and a significant decrease in the total number of 
supplemental, DOD, and consolidated appropriation acts during that time from 23 to 11. 
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Figure 3. DOD Appropriation Acts Enacted (2009–2016) in Addition 
to the DOD Regular Appropriation Bills. Adapted from Belasco 
(2014); Congressional Budget Office (n.d.-a). 
 
The other* amounts include additional non-war supplemental funding received by Congress. 
Figure 4. Department of Defense Base/OCO/Other Funding (FY01 and 
FY16). Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (2016).  
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The Overseas Contingency Operation/Global War on Terror budget amended 
request from 2001–2017, depicted as a percentage of the total budget authority for each 
year has gone from 28% at its peak in 2008 to 10% in 2016 (see Figure 5). From FY01 
and FY10, approximately 24% of all military spending came from an increase in OCO 
funding from $29 billion to $691 billion. Since, OCO funding has dropped to $59 billion 
(see Figure 6). Since May 2011, there has been a steady decrease in troops deployed in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq. From nearly 100,000 troops in May 2011 to below 10,000 
troops in Afghanistan in 2016 and from a peak in September 2007 of nearly 170,000 
troops to nearly zero troops in Iraq by the end of 2011 (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 5. OCO/GWOT Amounts as Percentage of Total DOD Budget 
Authority. Source: Williams & Epstein (2017). 
 30 
 
Figure 6. Cost of All Base and Contingency Efforts (2001–2017). 
Source: Cordesman (2016). 
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Figure 7. Troops In-country (2001–2016). Source: 
Williams & Epstein (2017). 
B. BUDGETING PRACTICES SHIFT BETWEEN 2001 AND 2016 
There was no set precedent for the executive branch for dealing with terrorist 
attacks against the homeland. So, in 2001, the attacks of 9/11 caused an immediate shift 
in budgeting practices, beginning with a significant change in Congressional delegation 
of budget authority to the DOD. From 2001 to 2009, all military activities and operations 
in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, were collectively referred to as the 
“Global War on Terrorism,” or GWOT, and funding for military operations during that 
time were designated as an “emergency” (Williams & Epstein, 2017). Ordinarily, 
Congress would be reluctant to deviate from the traditional patterns of control and trust 
the DOD with autonomy in managing its own budget priorities. However, following the 
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attacks in 2001, Congress increased delegation of resources management authority to the 
DOD leadership; thus, the DOD received more autonomy in budget execution (Candreva 
& Jones, 2005). Congress explicitly used the DERF account to delegate budget authority 
to the DOD from September 2001 to October 2003. Its intended purpose was to provide 
the DOD with the flexibility needed during the state of emergency. There were no 
specifics of the requirements, due to limited knowledge of the nature of the operations 
(Candreva & Jones, 2005). It was the DOD’s policy to budget for peacetime operations, 
so the specific amounts required by each service required extreme flexibility by the 
administration. The initial supplemental appropriation act provided the president with the 
authority to transfer the funds “to any authorized Federal Government activity.” For the 
DOD, that meant that the funds could be used for any type of expenditure that was in 
response to and recovery from the terrorist attacks (Candreva & Jones, 2005). This 
included funds for the Department of Justice, to seek out and prosecute terrorist, other 
funds were used for cleanup and recovery in New York City, and funds also went to 
increase homeland security (e.g., airports).  
Initially, the DOD spent sizeable amounts of funding from traditional 
appropriations accounts to fund the immediate response to and recovery from the terrorist 
attacks. The DOD used the DERF as a direct cite account, transferring funds from the 
traditional appropriation to reimburse the DERF, in violation of fiscal law. The 
Antideficiency Act prohibited the obligation of federal funds in advance of or in excess 
of an appropriation without the specific authority to do so (Candreva, 2017). Therefore, it 
was difficult to continue to use the DERF without the specific transfer authority to do so, 
which prompted, the DOD to seek and receive legislative approval for the specific 
transfer authority required to reimburse their traditional appropriation accounts with 
funds provided to the DERF (Candreva & Jones, 2005). By granting the DOD with this 
authority, the military deemed it acceptable to begin spending money from any 
appropriation with available funds for all activities related to the Global War on Terror 
with the idea that they would later reimburse the expended funds using the DERF.  
With such little restriction of use of the DERF funding coupled with an inability 
for Congress to efficiently oversee the DOD, Congress asked the GAO at the beginning 
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of FY02 to examine the DOD’s accounting practices as applied to contingency 
operations. The GAO report highlighted that there was “limited guidance and oversight 
combined with a lack of cost-consciousness which contributed to the questionable 
expenditure of contingency funds” (GAO, 2002, p. 3). Congress began to get stricter with 
the executive branch as debates over upcoming supplemental appropriations and the 
economic outlook of the United States gained negative attention from the congressional 
committees. However, in the FY03 budget, a total of $5.4 billion for 963 projects were 
earmarked by Congress. Congressional earmarks diverted funds from higher priority 
programs to programs that were not requested by the DOD. For example, the Defense 
Appropriations Act in 2002 included several unrequested medical research projects 
exceeding $600 million, for research on various types of cancer (Government Publishing 
Office, n.d.), resulting in the FY03 BR failing to pass, for only the second time since the 
inception of the process in 1976 (Candreva & Jones, 2005). The Bush administration 
became more frustrated with Congress as the war on terror expanded into Iraq in 2003. 
President Bush wrote a memo directed to Congress requesting that Congress authorize 
more flexibility and “refrain from attaching items not directly related to the emergency at 
hand” (Candreva & Jones, 2005). As transfers occurred from the DERF to other 
appropriations, the DOD comingled the funds, making it difficult for the DOD to 
accurately report the use of the DERF appropriations.  
Congress viewed the DERF as an account where money was poured in and 
unaccounted for by the DOD; with the recommendation by the GAO “to improve 
transparency and fiscal reponsibility related to funding the war on terrorism,” (GAO, 
2009, p. 3) Congress shut down the use of the DERF (Candreva & Jones, 2005, p. 8). In 
October 2003, any balances remaining in the DERF were directed to be merged with a 
new fund, the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF), established for the appropriation of specific 
funding for additional expenses for ongoing military operations in relation to the Global 
War on Terror. As the war in Iraq continued from 2004–2008, Congress reduced 
flexibility and tightened controls. The DOD was given reduced flexibility with the IFF 
and could no longer spend directly out of the DERF; instead, the DOD was now required 
to distribute the specific funds  into the appropriation accounts after the supplemental 
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appropriation was enacted (Belasco, 2014). Congressional scrutiny continued through the 
FY05 supplemental appropriation request, as lack of oversight and relaxed restrictions 
were evident as non-emergency items continued to slip into emergency supplemental 
requests (Candreva & Jones, 2005, p. 17; Rubin, 2009). Supplemental appropriations for 
contingency operations were being used to pay for the temporary end strength of 
personnel and operating costs of naval ships, even though the funding amounts in OCO 
were not tied directly to those expenses (Hale, 2016). Instead of using the PPBE process 
to project resources needed over a five-year span to support the strategic priorities of the 
nation, the DOD used one year money provided by supplemental appropriations to fund 
items normally provided for through the base budget. As a result, the future years defense 
program (FYDP) costs were understated, and the service commanders were unable to 
plan appropriately, affecting their ability to properly describe the requirements of the 
military operations to Congress. In 2005, approximately $10 billion of the $82 billion 
request was for things like the construction for the Baghdad embassy and the 
reorganization of the army brigades, things that were neither emergent or unforeseen 
(Rubin, 2009).  
In response to the pressure by Congress, the DOD changed the criteria for 
supplemental appropriations requests, allowing any and all costs associated with the 
“longer war on terror” to be used via supplemental appropriation funding. In 2008, over 
$5 billion was included in the supplemental appropriation for basic military pay, which 
was normally funded for through the Military Personnel (MILPERS) fund. More so, in 
2009, the DOD put a $70 billion placeholder (which did not include any details on what 
the funds would be used for) to budget for contingency operations in Iraq (Rubin, 2009). 
The tension between the executive branch and Congress rose with regard to funding the 
war, and confusion and debate surrounding funding for the wars was, in part, due to the 
unprecedented practices during the Bush administration, but continued through the 
Obama administration. The DOD request began to include items in excess of the 
requirements, and Congress argued that such items should be included in the base budget 
request. In response, Congress and the OMB constricted the criteria for OCO funding 
(Candreva, 2017). The election of a new president, shifted the the budgeting process. 
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Under a new regime, President Barack Obama released “A New Era of 
Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise,” a fiscal policy designed to create a 
separate budgetary designation for contingency funds in support of GWOT and to 
separate the budgetary designation, resulting in all military operations associated with the 
post 9/11 attacks now being labeled as “Overseas Contingency Operations” (OCO) 
(Williams & Epstein, 2017). Though the effort was applied to funds associated with post-
9/11 military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the administration created a specific 
label to distinguish it from GWOT funds; contingencies would no longer be funded using 
supplemental appropriations. Supplemental appropriations for contingency operations is 
a term often used interchangeably with the OCO/GWOT budget request rather than a 
normal supplemental measure (Williams & Epstein, 2017). Funding for contingency 
operations designated as an “emergency” or as an “Overseas Contingency 
Operation/Global War on Terror” (OCO/GWOT) requirement would now be approved 
and provided for through a separate appropriation (Williams & Epstein, 2017). This new 
account was intended to restore funding for contingency operations. An OCO budget 
would be submitted in addition to and with the base budget, reserving the use of 
supplemental funding for situations, which qualified under the definition of use for a 
supplemental appropriation (Williams & Epstein, 2017). Until 2010, the costs of 
contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other military operations in support of 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT) were funded through supplemental appropriations as 
the regular base budget for defense, through the DERF and IFF accounts. In 2011, in an 
effort to further move war-related funding back into the annual base budget cycle, the 
Obama administration disassociated the various supplemental accounts of GWOT with 
contingency funding and only used the term “Overseas Contingency Operations” (OCO) 
to refer to contingency funding. This account differed from the DERF and IFF accounts 
in that it called for the service chiefs to request funding for war-related activities at the 
same time the regular request for the base budget request was submitted. Even though the 
term evolved from GWOT to OCO, the purpose of the funding associated with these 
terms remained unchanged (Candreva, 2017).  
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With all of the changes of the new OCO mechanisms, the most significant change 
included the use of OCO funding for non-wartime needs (Hale, 2016). Critics note that 
the ability to fund non-wartime needs created ambiguity and many gray areas which 
Congress felt undermined the integrity of the budget (Hale, 2016) The changes also 
included a requirement that defense budget estimates be prepared in as much as two-
years in advance; with the uncertainty of wartime activities as they changed to fit the 
needs of the war, military leaders wanted to provide as much cushion in their request to 
cover any unforeseen events that might arise during operations (Hale, 2016). Congress 
argued that supplemental appropriations were not meant to fund wars and that the “longer 
war on terror” no longer fit the definition of an emergency (Hale, 2016). In response, the 
OMB sought to clearly define the new OCO mechanism. The definition included the 
things OCO can fund such as any operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries 
related to the war against terror, deployment and transportation costs to wartime theaters, 
special war-time pay, replacement of equipment destroyed or damaged due to wartime 
operations or resetting equipment to restore it to a pre-war capability, and other indirect 
costs on a case by case basis. Additionally, the funds provided by OCO would only 
portray wartime costs for the upcoming year to account for the significant change in costs 
as the war progressed (Hale, 2016). OCO would receive special treatment under the 
provisions of the BCA; though not subject to the budget caps imposed by the BCA, the 
new OCO mechanism would be subject to sequestration if the appropriation for OCO 
exceeded the caps set by law. Lastly, it defined what limitations were placed on OCO 
funding by law, mainly related to the target set for the total OCO funding amount. When 
the rules and definitions changed, and called for OCO funding to be separated from the 
base into a separate OCO account, Congress and policy-makers began to take advantage 
of the OCO/GWOT account. From 2011 to 2016, Congress appropriated an additional 
$560 billion for contingency operations (Candreva, 2017). 
As the urgency and suddenness of the wars decreased, the FY12 DOD budget 
request sent to Congress reflected the change in requirements. The base budget request 
increased approximately 3% from the prior years request while the DOD OCO funding  
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request fell sharply, a 27% decrease, allowing room for congressional add-ins (Towell, 
2012, p. 11). Congress added funds for the DOD “must pay” bills such as basic housing 
allowances, incentive pays, fuel prices and base support expenses, childcare center, 
barracks improvements, mental health programs, aircraft production facing line cut-offs, 
and National Guard and Reserve equipment (Belasco, 2014, pp. 26–27). More recently, 
financing non-war activities using OCO is increasing and forces the DOD to plan for and 
pay for long-term defense requirements by using one-year money. The new OCO 
mechanism introduced funding practices that were inconsistent with the DOD’s budget 
execution and required transferring “tens of billions of OCO dollars” back into the base 
defense budget (Hale, 2016, p. 2). The DOD’s FMR specified that war costs are costs 
incurred because troops were deployed to war and did not cover things like base pay, 
normal training, or planned equipment modernizations (Hale, 2016). 
There is also a civil component of OCO funding that includes additional efforts 
that are not a part of the efforts to fight terrorists and extremists. Since 2012, Congress 
has appropriated more than the Department of State (DOS) requested in OCO funds that 
were authorized for non–war-related activities to be used in additional countries as 
foreign aid and other diplomatic operations (Williams & Epstein, 2017; see Figure 8). 
After the enactment of the BCA, Congress used the OCO account to deliberately add to 
the base requirements for both civil and military funding, simply to avoid the 
enforcement rules of the BCA (Candreva, 2017). The BCA had two components: an 
automatic enforcement regime intended to cut federal spending and the Joint Select 
Committee of Deficit Reduction also known as the “supercommittee” to develop a deficit 
reduction plan over a 10-year span. Failure to develop a deficit reduction plan would 
result in sequestration, the first across-the-board cuts scheduled to occur on January 1, 
2013 (Knudsen, 2012). By December 2012, the supercommittee had failed to agree on a 
deficit reduction plan, thus triggering sequestration in 2013. The American Taxpayer 
Relief Act was not a solution but temporarily delayed sequestration by preventing the tax 




Figure 8. DOS OCO Budget Authority (2012–2016). Source: 
Williams & Epstein (2017). 
In December 2013, President Obama signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act 
(BBA) of 2013, which raised the sequestration caps by $45 billion for FY14 and $18 
billion for FY15 (see Figure 9). In 2014, the DOD transferred approximately $20 billion 
in O&M funds from the base budget into the budget request for OCO. Additionally 
Congress moved $9.2 billion from the base budget into the OCO appropriation. The 
FY15 OCO request included personnel costs, O&M costs, Procurement costs, Research 
& Development (R&D) costs, and Military Construction costs (MILCON) totaling nearly 
$59 billion (National Security Network, 2014; Belasco, 2014). The Bipartisan Budget Act 
was amended in 2015, increasing spending caps again for 2016 and 2017 by $50 billion 
and $30 billion, respectively (see Figure 9). It also increased spending on OCO funding 
(defense and non-defense) by over $15 billion above the president’s FY16 request 
(Moffit, 2015). Congress moved $38 billion to the OCO account from the FY16 base 
budget request to get around the budget caps (Belasco, 2015). Still again in 2016, of the 
$58.8 billion, Congress directed that $18 billion be moved to the base budget for 
additional procurement to fund items on the unfunded priority list submitted by the DOD 
(Blakeley, 2016). The civil component costs of OCO include over $9 billion in FY15, 
approximately $15 billion in FY16 and FY17 alike (Cordesman, 2016; see Figure 9). 
 39 
 
Figure 9. Defense Budget and Budget Control Act. Source: 
Candreva (2017). 
C. CONCLUSION 
Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Congress deviated from normal 
budgeting practices to provide more flexibility in the time of a crisis with little regard to 
the standard rules of budgeting. With an increase in flexibility, the DOD mismanaged the 
authority given by Congress with respect to managing the DERF, causing Congress to 
rescind that authority and regain control over DOD budgeting by adding restrictions to 
the DERF account. The executive branch desired greater flexibility and became frustrated 
with the congressional scrutiny over budget authority delegation. Congress determined 
that the DOD budgeting practices were unreliable and ceased using the DERF account, 
replacing it with the IFF which inherintly had more strings attached. Doing so caused 
further tension between the president and Congress.  
Between 2001 and 2008 there was a significant reliance on supplemental 
appropriations to fund military contingency operations overseas. After the invasion of 
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Iraq in 2003, the military OPTEMPO increased validating the need for more money. 
Natural disasters between 2004 and 2006 had a huge impact on the number of 
supplemental appropriations enacted during this time. Funding both the wars and the 
natural disaster caused a rise in the nation’s deficit. In 2009, a new administration 
implemented new rules for funding contingencies and emergencies using supplemental 
appropriations. The new OCO mechanism changed budgeting practices significantly, 
mandating that OCO requests be submitted with and in addtion to the base budget 
request.  
In 2011, in an effort to better manage the national deficit, President Obama signed 
the BCA into law, which led to a sequestration threat in 2013 and two subsequent BBA 
which raised the sequestration caps for each year between 2014 and 2017. In order to 
fully fund defense, congressional leaders added money to the OCO account, which was 
meant for fighting the war associated with the Global War on Terror, even though the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were winding down and there was a decrease in troop levels 
in-country (Martin, 2015). The ability to use the OCO funding provided Congress with 
the flexibility to fund additional requirements without being subject to budget caps and 
sequestration (Candreva, 2017). But still, Congress padded the OCO request for these 
years with base budget requirements to circumvent the sequestration process. In both the 
Pentagon and Congress, the desire to expand the base budget while seemingly 
maintaining fiscal responsibility motivated policy-makers to compromise the rules for 
budgeting to meet the expectations of stakeholders. The amount of supplemental 
appropriations did decrease significantly between 2009 and 2016; however, the 
use/misuse of the OCO appropriation still occurred. 
Military operations overseas are still highly active, and war is still a threat; 
however, after 15 years, the idea of overseas contingency operations can no longer be 
considered sudden, unforeseen, or temporary. The initial threat in the Middle East 
demanded urgency; however, between 2001 and 2016 the threat evolved in a way in 
which now can be anticipated, allowing the ability to budget with foresight and 
comprehensiveness. Budgeting practices in both the Pentagon and Congress have evolved 
over the years as both organizations have at times sought flexibility for the military 
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mission and discipline in the process. Changes in priorities may have resulted in 
processes that are less than ideal. Conversely, the attempts to add discipline to the process 
prompts a different set of practices that also compromise sound budgeting principles. 
There is a compromise that exists between effective budgeting and supporting military 
contingency operations, for both the legislatures and the policy-makers. Sometimes 
policy-makers fail to create a budget that incorporates all the qualities of effective public 
budgeting; thus, compromises are made to achieve the objective. Supporters claim that 
the various practices over time are necessary to achieve success in the military 
contingency operations in support of the Global War on Terror. And, critics refer to the 
contingency operations funds as “a slush fund” that allows Congress the ability to 
circumvent governing budget rules which do not allow budgeting for contingencies. Due 
to budgeting practices continually evolving, government has emphasized the importance 
of incorporating successful practices that ensure the delivery of a more effective and 
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IV. THE COMPROMISE OF SOUND BUDGETING PRINCIPLES 
IN CONTINGENCY FUNDING 
The overall goal of this chapter is to analyze budgeting practices for funding 
contingency operations between 2001 and 2016 to determine the extent to which actual 
budgeting practices match the ideal budgeting practices to achieve the main objective of 
sound budgeting. An examination of the fluctuation in budgeting practices between 2001 
and 2016 determines whether the changes in national strategic priorities resulted in 
budgeting practices that were less than ideal. To draw a conclusion, I compared the actual 
practices described in Chapter III with the ideal practices described in Chapter II, 
discussed the different compromises among the sound budgeting principles in funding for 
contingency operations over time, and evaluated the impact those compromises had on 
budgeting for contingency operations.  
I illustrated the compromises among the principles of sound public budgeting 
along a spectrum of high, medium, and low according to how the principles were applied 
in actual budgeting practices during significant periods of change between 2001 and 
2016. Of the 10 characteristics described by World Bank (1998), I used only six of the 
principles to match the budgeting practices between 2001 and 2016. I chose flexibility, 
predictability, transparency, information, discipline, and legitimacy because they are the 
most applicable to the purpose of this research (see Table 1). I used how the principles 
were applied to demonstrate the compromises and the motivation for the compromises 
and to determine whether it was necessary or even integral for policy-makers to 
compromise sound budgeting principles in budgeting for contingencies versus budgeting 
for normal operations. Along a spectrum of high, medium, and low, I used empirical 
evidence of budgeting practices by Congress, the administration, and/or the DOD when 
budgeting practices were less than ideal and compared those practices with the qualities 
of the principles to see whether there was a discernible pattern among budgeting for 
contingencies and compromising the integrity of the budget system. 
In Chapter II, flexibility was explained as senior leaders possessing the 
managerial authorization for making decisions on spending. A high level of budget 
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flexibility is seen when the budget process delegates budget authority with a high degree 
of resource decision autonomy to senior leadership charged with knowing and 
understanding the budget requests for their program needs. A medium level of budget 
flexibility is seen when practices do not prescribe how resources are expended and 
requirements are prioritized and there is a failure to exercise restraint. A low level of 
budget flexibility restricts budget authority delegation and prevents or delays the flow of 
resources for unforeseen circumstances. 
Predictability discussed the importance of policy-makers knowing the program 
requirements and the resource flow. A high level of predictability exemplifies an 
understanding of both the program needs and the resource flow of funding. Other 
indicators of high levels of predictability include allowing policy-makers sufficient time 
to make decisions using detailed information from historical budget data. A medium level 
of predictability indicates that the implementation of policies and programs did not 
consider the balance between future needs and the available resources as a result in the 
lack of knowledge of the program requirements. A low level of predictability is seen 
when last-minute requests lack necessary details, resulting in disorderly budgeting 
practices. 
Transparency dealt with the accessibility of a clearly communicated budget 
document and all the relevant budgetary information to the general public. A high level 
of transparency involves clearly commuinicating the priorities for which policy-makers 
decide on funding. It is also seen when all relevant data and costs projections result, in a 
timely manner, in a budget document that is accessible by the public. A medium level of 
transparency occurs when the budget process lacks the necessary details of funding needs 
and does not include program performance information on value-for-money as a basis to 
fully explain resource allocation or to determine future budget allocation needs. A low 
level of transparency deliberately withholds pertinent information relevant to the budget 
process or vaguely describes the use of funds. It is also seen in the application of creative 
budgeting measures to achieve unclear objectives unknown to the public. 
The principle of information was described in the form of accuracy and reliability 
of projections throughout the decision-making process. A high level of information uses 
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accurate budgetary information on costs, outputs, and outcomes relevant to reinforce 
honest, unbiased estimates. A medium level of information will not present sufficient 
information about program funding in a timely manner to allow policy-makers time to 
make sound budget decisions. A low level of information improperly defines program 
costs, ignores relevant data, and disregards the feasibility of accurately appropriating 
funds, given the lack of quality of information. 
Discipline was defined as moving through the critical steps of the bureaucratic 
processess while staying within revenue and expense limits. A high level of budget 
discipline is seen when the budget process follows the statutes and rules, is completed on 
time, and adheres to revenue and expense limits. A medium level of budget discipline is 
seen when practices disregard the rules or takes advantage of vague or contradictory 
rules, or is not completed in a timely maner, or slightly misses expense limits. A low 
level of discipline will flaunt the rules, be disruptively late, or deliberately miss expense 
limits.  
Legitimacy was defined as the integral piece to ensure that policy-makers 
involved the necessary people during the formulation of the budget to guarantee the 
budget was implemented appropriately. A high level of legitmacy aligns program needs 
with budget requests, includes feedback, and allows for significant input by service chiefs 
and other senior leaders. A medium level of legitimacy will not include input from senior 
members of the agency resulting in an appropriation of funds that is not based on 
strategic capabilities. A low level of legitimacy deliberately appropriates funds 
improperly to circumvent budget enforcement rules, commingles funds, or purposely 
over appropriates or inadequately appropriates funds to meet program needs.  
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Table 1. High, Medium, and Low Spectrum of the Application of 
the Sound Budgeting Principles 
 High Medium Low 
Flexibility 
The budget practices 
delegate’s budget 
authority with a high 
degree of resource 





practices do not 
prescribe how the 
funds are spent, 




and does not 
exercise restraint. 
The budget practices 
restrict budget 
authority delegation to 





that disallow the flow 




The budget practices 
reflects an 
understanding of the 
program requirements 
and the resource flow 
for funding and 
includes detailed data 
based on past 
occurrences to allow 




practices do not 
implement policies 
and programs that 
balance the needs of 
the future with the 
resources that are 
currently available 
and lack the 
necessary 
knowledge of the 
program 
requirements. 
The budget practices 
include last minute 
funding requests with 
lacking details and 
dispersed information 
that may disrupt the 
budgeting process and 
priorities of other 
program needs. 
Transparency 
The budget practices 
clearly communicate 
the priorities upon 
which the policy-
makers make 
decisions, include all 
relevant data and 
costs projections, and 
makes information 
accessible to the 
public for review in a 
timely manner. 
The budget 









details of funding 
needs, and do not 
fully explain how 
resources are being 
expended. 
The budget practices 
deliberately withhold 
pertinent information 
relevant to the budget 
process or vaguely 
describe the use of 
funds, do not clearly 
communicate priorities 
to the public, and use 
creative budgeting to 
distort prescribed rules 
of the budget process. 
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 High Medium Low 
Information 
The budget practices 
use accurate 
budgetary 
information on costs, 
outputs, and 
outcomes relevant to 
reinforce projections, 
to include unbiased 
projections based on 
facts, and that are 








are not published 
for review, and are 
not presented in a 
clear and timely 
manner. 
The budget practices 
improperly define 
program costs; ignore 
relevant data and 
information, and 
disregards quality of 
information and 
feasibility of cost. 
Discipline 
The budget practices 
follow guiding 
statutes and rules, are 
completed on time, 
and adhere to revenue 
and expense limits. 
The budget 
practices do not 
completely follow 
the rules, take 
advantage of vague 
or contradictory 
rules, are not 
completed in a 
timely manner, or 
slightly miss 
expense limits. 
The budget practices 
flaunt the rules, are 




The budget practices 
align program needs 
with the request from 
the agencies which 
the funding is for, 
includes feedback, 
and allows significant 
input by service 




practices do not 
include the inputs 
from the agency's 
senior leaders in the 
formulation of the 
budget and do not 
appropriate funds 
based on strategic 
capabilities. 










appropriates funds to 




A. MAPPING THE PRINCIPLES TO THE EVENTS BETWEEN 2001 AND 
2008 
President Bush sought to maximize executive control in the budgeting process, 
while Congress also desired greater control. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the 
Bush administration provided funding for war-related activities using the DERF. The 
DERF was convenient to use in the case of an “emergency.” It had high levels of 
flexibility as Congress could delegate budget authority and transfer authority to the DOD 
using this account with little to no restrictions on use of funds. As the DERF became 
unmanageable by Congress, the IFF was created to impose more discipline by 
implementing better guidelines for use of funds while still allowing for high levels of 
flexibility. During Bush’s second term in office, the DOD began taking advantage of the 
vague rules of the IFF to increase flexibility. The administration was not good about 
disclosing the costs associated with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which caused an 
increase in tension between the executive branch and Congress during that time (Rubin, 
2009). This resulted in less than ideal budgeting practices by the president, Congress, and 
the DOD in funding for contingency operations.  
1. DERF Period (2001–2003) 
Shortly after the chaos of 9/11, the executive branch argued that the combatant 
commanders should make budget decisions based on military effectiveness and national 
security to ensure that the defense budget properly supported the needs of the military 
operations. There was little pressure to balance confidentiality with discretion while 
funding military operations. Traditionally, Congress would shy away from delegating 
budget authority to the DOD but felt it necessary in the country’s time of crisis to grant 
an increase in flexibility to support the Global War on Terror campaign (Candreva & 
Jones, 2005). Ideally, due to the unforeseen nature of the terrorist attacks, Congress 
would be expected to grant budget authority to senior military leaders with little 
expectation for detailed information, resource requirements, or the resource flow for such 
items. As was the case, Congress delegated budget authority to the DOD with a high 
degree of resource decision autonomy with few to no statutes to guide the DOD’s 
budgeting practices. In doing so, the executive branch used emergency supplemental 
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appropriations extensively to fund contingency operations through the DERF account 
(Rubin, 2009). The DERF account had the advantage of maximizing flexibility to 
immediately address the requirements of items essential to the contingency operations in 
support of war-related activities overseas and it allowed the DOD to use the DERF as a 
direct cite account with little accountability or restriction of use. The balances in the 
DERF never expired, could be used for a wide-range of purposes, and were authorized by 
an appropriation whenever requested by the theater commander (Candreva, 2017). 
In 2002, the DOD expended sizeable amounts of resources from other 
appropriation titles to fund all the military activities related to the Global War on Terror 
with an expectation that they would be able to reimburse the traditional appropriations 
using the DERF (Candreva & Jones, 2005). Under normal conditions, budgeting 
processes are governed by fiscal law which prohibits the use of funds to improperly 
augment appropriations (Candreva, 2017). The DERF lacked appropriation restrictions 
that were in accordance with fiscal law and the DOD took advantage of the rules by 
improperly defining program requirements, including last minute budget requests with 
vague details, and not fully prescribing how the funds were being spent. Questions 
concerning the validity of the DOD’s budget authority delegation and ability to manage 
transferring funds associated with the DERF account prompted Congress to ask the GAO 
to investigate the DOD’s accounting practices in budgeting for contingencies and 
examine the use of OCO funds related to and in the support of contingency operations. 
Typically, Congress would be expected to desire to shift practices to resemble normal 
budgeting practices. However, Congress sought to implement more discipline in the 
process by establishing better budgeting guidelines for the DOD to follow while 
budgeting for contingency operations. The lack of information, transparency, and 
predictability incited Congress to seek for greater Congressional control over budgeting 
practices used in funding contingency operations.   
In FY03, the total budget request for the DOD included $59.9 billion as DERF 
with use of funds described vaguely and using broad terms like “up to” and a request for 
maximum transfer authority of all funds (Candreva & Jones, 2005). Congress continued 
to freely give the president supplemental appropriations with no restrictions to adequately 
 50 
meet program needs, but there was an increase of tension between the executive branch 
and Congress as the executive branch sought greater flexibility (Rubin, 2009). The 
Congress looked to create a better way to appropriate funds to the DOD that provided 
better guidance and oversight of contingency operations expenditures.   
Between 2001 and 2003, the general use of the term OCO/GWOT was designated 
to describe military operations overseas and sometimes domestically as well; and, there 
was little to no distinction between what was funded for defense and what was funded for 
contingency operations. This designation shifted the congressional procedures that related 
to OCO/GWOT funds by providing more procedural flexibility and less budgetary 
enforcement beginning immediately after the attacks of 9/11. In this period, there was 
high flexibility with an attempt to legitimize budget efforts by having combatant 
commanders make decisions. But the Bush administration and the DOD made 
compromises among the principles of information, predictability, discipline, and 
transparency. Because of the lack of details and the suddenness of events, there were no 
set rules to guide budgeting practices during that time (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Sound Budgeting Principles Applied to the DERF Period 
(2001–2003). 





The DERF Period (2001-2003) 
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2. IFF Period (2003–2005) 
In FY03, the Congress discontinued the use of the DERF account and began using 
a new account to appropriate funds to the DOD. Ideally, as more time lapsed it is 
expected that Congress would return to normal budgeting practices. At that time, 
Congress sought to reestablish congressional control by implementing more discipline in 
the budget process and requiring greater transparency and predictability in the budgeting 
practices (Rubin, 2009). Instead of appropriating the $59.9 billion as requested by the 
DOD, Congress appropriated only $15.7 billion via a newly established fund. The Iraqi 
Freedom Fund (IFF) implemented restrictions and tightened controls; the executive 
branch and the Congress began using the IFF to further fund contingencies in support of 
the Global War on Terror. 
In 2005, non-emergency items were included in the emergency supplemental 
appropriations for defense (Rubin, 2009). For instance, Congress took advantage of the 
public’s willingness to fund the war by padding the war needs with other, unrelated needs 
including $5 billion set aside in the defense appropriation for foreign policy. This is 
contrary from what is typically expected to happen. As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
evolved, ideally there would be more details to allow for greater information, 
predictability, and transparency. The boundary of what belonged in the base budget 
versus what was considered an “emergency” had shifted over time. The vagueness of the 
rules negatively compromised the principles of discipline and further impacted 
transparency because the priorities were not clearly communicated to the public by 
mixing emergency and non-emergency items, legitimacy by deliberately padding the 
defense budget with unrelated requirements, and predictability by not properly balancing 
the available resources with the needs of the future. 
Congressional scrutiny continued to place pressure on policy-makers to change 
the budgeting practices that were not in keeping with the principles of sound budgeting. 
From 2003 to 2005, Congress tried to steer budgeting practices in the direction of ideal 
practices by eradicating the use of the DERF and implementing the IFF. However, there 
was a trade-off between discipline and legitimacy that resulted in an adverse decrease in 
discipline. By implementing guidelines, rules, and restriction with the IFF, there was an 
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initial increase in discipline but a decrease in the level of legitimacy because funds that 
were appropriated did not align the inputs from senior leaders about the requirements of 
their programs. Instead funds were not appropriated based on strategic capabilities but 
rather on the agenda of Congress. Although there were more restrictions on the use of 
funds, flexibility remained high because it was the combatant commander driving the 
budget, not Congress. Predictability and information did not change because of the IFF. 
Though, information was not sufficient, it did improve transparency from the levels seen 
during the DERF period regarding the program requirements due to the restriction of the 
IFF that included that funds must be “transferred to various appropriations to meet the 
most urgent requirements from Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Global War on 
Terrorism” (Under Secretary of Defense, 2003, p. 1; see Figure 11). 
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3. Bush’s Second Term (2005–2008) 
In FY06, the supplemental appropriation request of $116 billion was not received 
until the middle of the year which allowed little time for Congress to review the request; 
thus, the request was not approved by Congress until late in the fiscal year (Hale, 2016; 
Williams & Epstein, 2017). The services (mainly the Army, which received most of the 
funding from the supplemental appropriations) were forced to use funds provided from 
other funding sources to fund war-time activities, violating fiscal law (Hale, 2016). 
Supplemental appropriations were often requested mid-year, were provided for in large 
amounts, and included insufficient details of the use of funds provided (Hale, 2016). This 
was contrary to what would be expected from the budgeting process. Ideally, all budget 
requests should be presented in a timely manner, in accordance with the budget schedule, 
and approved in a timely fashion to ensure that program needs are adequately provided 
and appropriated for. This example illustrates how budgeting practices included last 
minute funding requests with insufficient details, forcing service chiefs to use creative 
budgeting to achieve strategic objectives and forcing Congress to make hasty decisions 
regarding funding. This illustrated how the service chiefs made compromises among 
predictability by requesting funding at the last minute which did not allow time for 
Congress to make decisions in a timely fashion which compromised budget discipline 
and disrupted the budgeting process. These practices also degrade information because 
Congress is forced to make budget decisions with little regard to the quality of the 
information and/or feasibility of cost due to the limitation of time. 
By FY07, the DOD was still seeking greater flexibility. For instance, the DOD 
took advantage of appropriated funds that were authorized for war-related activities. As 
an example, the DOD requested funding for the V-22 aircraft (still in production) to 
replace the H-1’s that were lost in combat. Although the DOD’s request was considered 
in excess to the requirement and stricken from the request by OMB, the DOD sought 
greater flexibility by “broadly interpreting” the rules (Candreva, 2017). This was contrary 
to the norm: Congress provided appropriation funding for major aircraft using 
supplemental appropriations in place of incremental funding as intended for normal 
budgeting practices. This was a prime example of a lack of discipline in the budget 
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process where imprecise statutes allow opportunity for rules to be misinterpreted. The 
DOD practices also decreased predictability because the future needs were not balanced 
with the available resources present to provide for the then-current program requirements. 
Supplemental appropriations are usually reserved to fund emergencies and exceptional 
circumstances, so the DOD issued guidance allowing the use of supplemental 
appropriations for all costs associated with the “longer war on terror” (Hale, 2016). Once 
again, Congress began expressing “concerns about the use of supplemental 
appropriations to fund wars” (Hale, 2016, p. 4). 
During President Bush’s term in office, an accumulation of things attributed to the 
significant change in budgeting practices. Tax cuts and deficit growth with an emphasis 
on “expanding the executive role of budgetary power” was the Bush administration 
headline. U.S. events during the 2001–2008 period are partly to blame for the major 
shifts seen in budgeting practices during that time (Rubin, 2009). In sum, the Bush 
administration focused more on loyalty to the services rather than on transparency in 
budgeting and financial accountability (Rubin, 2009). One would have expected a return 
to more normal budgeting practices during Bush’s second term in office, but that did not 
occur. Immediately following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress and the 
administration used budgeting practices as expected, but as time continued, Congress 
urged budgeting practices to revert to normal. In doing so, Congress implemented the 
IFF, which proved to increase the level of information and discipline but compromised 
legitimacy by taking advantage of the vague guidelines of the IFF. These budgeting 
practices resulted in low levels for five of the six budgeting principles. And, a medium 
level of flexibility, because the budgeting practices did not exercise restraint, did not 
prescribe how the funds were spent, and needs were not prioritized in accordance to 
resource allocation (see Figure 12). Nonetheless, the budgeting practices for funding 
OCO using supplemental appropriations failed to align with the sound budgeting 
principles and provide a budget that upkeeps the integrity of the budgeting process. 
Consequently, in 2009, with the implementation of new leadership, there was a call to 
change the criteria for funding OCO. 
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Figure 12. Sound Budgeting Principles as Applied to Bush’s Second 
Term (2005–2008). 
B. MAPPING THE PRINCIPLES TO THE OF EVENTS BETWEEN 2009 
AND 2016 
As the level of troops in country began to sharply decline beginning in FY09, 
OCO funding remained high and there was still not enough restriction in the budgeting 
practices to prevent the misuse of OCO funds (see Figure 13). According to the DOD 
budget document, the OCO funding remained high to support in-theater support costs for 
units operating outside the Afghanistan and Iraq regional area who provided combat 
support to the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq (Hale, 2016). Most of the in-theater support 
costs were funded for separately, mainly in the base budget, therefore resulting in 
inconsistent budgeting practices in the DOD’s budget of what was being requested 
compared to what was spent (Hale, 2016; see Figure 13).  
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Figure 13. Appropriation provided FY01 and FY16 and Total Number 
of Troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Adapted from Belasco (2009); 
Williams & Epstein (2017).  
President Barack Obama sought to restore the principles of sound public 
budgeting back into the budget process regarding funding contingency operations by 
establishing a fiscal policy that promoted fiscal responsibility. In doing so, the 
administration switched from GWOT to OCO, moved from supplemental appropriations 
to annual OCO requests, and began including a placeholder in the defense budget for out-
year requirements. These were all attempts to increase discipline, predictability, and 
transparency. But in 2009, when the DOD put a $70 billion placeholder in the budget 
request without any details on how the DOD would apply this money to the war-related 
activities in Afghanistan and/or Iraq, “commentators began to call the supplementals 
‘blank checks’” (Rubin, 2009, p. 5). 
 1. Obama’s First Years (2009–2011) 
In 2009, OCO rules permitted the use of OCO funding to purchase equipment that 
was destroyed while conducting contingency operation in a wartime region but did not 
clearly state how OCO funds would be used to replace equipment that would take years 
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to produce (Hale, 2016). Costs to purchase major equipment are usually funded through 
procurement funds (available to use for three years) and not incrementally funded on an 
annual basis. This change in budgeting practices lacked predictability because it allowed 
last-minute budget requests with low levels of information, and the request contained few 
details about balancing the present resources with future needs. It also had low levels of 
legitimacy because the new OCO rules contradicted fiscal law of purpose, time, and 
amount by commingling funds appropriated for war time activities with funds 
appropriated for procurement. The vagueness alone dictates low levels of transparency. 
The budgeting practices from 2009 to 2011 prompted Congress and the OMB to consider 
re-defining OCO to include guidelines on what OCO can fund and what was required to 
be budgeted for through the regular base budget. 
Early in 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in an interview that due 
to the delay in funding supplemental appropriations, Congress would have to do “stupid” 
things in order to cash-flow wartime operations because of a lack of predictability; he 
hoped that the new OCO mechanism would provide a more lasting relief from major 
disruptions throughout the planning phase of formulating the budget (Wallace, 2010). 
Typically, supplemental appropriations funded contingency operations and if the new 
OCO mechanism required the DOD to submit a separate supplemental request 
simultaneaously with the regular budget request, a delay by Congress in funding the 
appropriations would be expected. These budgeting practices had a medium level of 
discipline since budgets were not completed in a timely manner. However, it increased 
legitmacy and transparency because the budgeting practices clearly communicated the 
priorities of the program needs by the service leaders to the public.  
In 2010, recommendations provided by the GAO prompted changes for better 
reporting of the DOD’s OCO obligations (GAO, 2017). As expected, the OMB along 
with the DOD sought to define the new OCO mechanism to restore budgetary integrity. 
The changes to the OCO criteria were intended to implement discipline that would 
improve transparency, legitimacy, and reliability of information, while still allowing the 
level of flexibility needed to make efficient decisions on program requirements. The 
DOD, in response, began validating OCO obligations quarterly and collecting costs data 
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using an accounting system instead of manual collection to verify accounting and qualify 
the costs-of-war reports sent to Congress to increase the reliability of information, 
legitimacy, and predictability (GAO, 2017).  
In 2011, the BCA was established to reduce the deficit and balance the budget. 
Since OCO funds were typically designated as “emergency” funds, the BCA caps did not 
apply (Williams & Epstein, 2017). The term OCO had replaced all other terms related to 
funding contingency operations that were in support of the Global War on Terror. It 
would be expected that budget enforcement mechanisms like the BCA would restrict 
practices that compromised the principles of sound budgeting. Ideally, the BCA would 
implement greater discipline throughout the budget process by imposing restrictions that 
limited funding. However, it erodes transparency because the restrictions motivated 
policy-makers to make compromises in other budget priorities to adequately fund defense 
for war time activities. The BCA stressed a high level of predictability and information 
by requiring federal agencies to plan for and program their requirement needs based on 
timely and accurate budgetary information to allow policy-makers time to make sound 
budget decisions. The BCA had a dramatic effect on the size of the deficit and did rein in 
spending. DOD lost hundreds of billions of dollars in the base budget across the FYDP 
and Congress restored only a few tens of billions by taking advantage of OCO.  
The OCO appropriation differed from the previous funds in that it separated OCO 
funding from supplemental appropriations, and OCO budget requests would then be 
submitted concurrently with the regular base budget request for defense. Congress would 
provide funding for contingency operations using a separate supplemental appropriation 
bill. The new way of funding OCO requirements sought to allow the level of flexibility in 
budget authority that was required for contingency operations while increasing 
predictability by understanding the program needs and requirements, increasing 
discipline by capturing all the funding related to war activities in one account, and 
increasing legitimacy by giving more authority to the DOD to include item requirements 
needed for contingency operations. However, the inherent flexibility in the use of OCO 
caused variation in the interpretation of the guidelines; thus, decreasing the quality of 
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information by skewing the projections and outcome of future war activities as it related 
to current operations (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14. Sound Budgeting Principles as Applied to Obama’s First 
Years (2009–2011). 
2. Deficit Control Period (2012–2016) 
With the new OCO mechanism guidelines and the enactment of the BCA, the 
budget process seemed to be improving. Then in 2013, due to the limitation of the BCA 
of 2011, the United States faced sequestration that would result in an across-the-board cut 
to all discretionary spending. The government would be expected to act in the best 
interest of the citizens, operate within the guidelines of the law, and properly plan the 
budget in accordance with the rules. Doing so would demonstrate practices that were 
highly discplined, legitimate, and transparent with a high level of information. Instead, 
President Obama requested an increase to the budget caps, and Congress obliged by 
enacting the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) to increase the sequestration caps for 2014 
from $498.1 billion to $520.5 billion and for 2015 from $512 billion to $521.3 billion in 
exchange for extending the imposition of the budget caps under the BCA into 2022 and 
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2023 (United States House of Representatives, 2013). The enactment of the BBA 
compromised discipline for flexibility. 
Still, in 2014, the Congress began to purposely add base requirements to the OCO 
account, even though the spending limits were already increased. For example, the DOD 
transferred close to $20 billion from the O&M appropriation request from the base 
budget into the OCO appropriation request, resulting in Congress moving an additional 
$9.6 billion of non–war-related funding from the base budget appropriation into the OCO 
account. Ideally, the actions of Congress would support the laws and encourage 
budgeting practices that were congruent to the principles of sound budgeting. But these 
budgeting practices compromised predictability by imposing last minute changes into the 
funding requests, legitimacy by deliberately appropriating funds with the intention to 
later move them to circumvent the enforcement rules, and transparency by inaccurately 
communicating the priorities of the budget to the public, in exchange for even more 
flexibility. The effect was an overall cut of less than 1% from defense spending as 
opposed to the mandated sequester cut of $34 billion for FY14 (National Security 
Network, 2014).  
In 2015, the accounts of misuse appeared more than in previous years. For 
instance, the DOD submitted a budget request that surpassed the BCA caps by nearly $38 
billion. Dreading having to force Congress to decide whether to trigger sequestration or 
reduce the president’s budget, the president wrote a statement justifying the excess need 
for an increase in spending. In response, Congress moved over $38 billion from the 
defense base budget into the OCO appropriation (Williams & Epstein, 2017). In 
accordance with the BCA, the Congress should have either triggered sequestration or cut 
funding from the president’s budget request. Although, the Congress granted the 
president request for more money, the president vetoed the Congressional action, stating 
the actions was fiscally irresponsible and did not provide a sound budget solution 





transparency, and legitimacy as he stated in his veto that “this bill fails to authorize 
funding for our national defense in a fiscally responsible manner” (Williams & Epstein, 
2017, p. 23). In response, the BBA of 2015 was signed into law, increasing the budget 
caps for FY16 and FY17.  
Still, in 2016 after a second BBA passed, raising the sequestration caps for 2016 
and 2017, Congress continued to use the OCO account as a “slush fund” to fund non–
war-related items. The president’s OCO budget request for FY17 included $58.8 billion 
for defense, which complied with the target level imposed by the BCA but included $5.1 
billion that was reserved for base budget requirements not funded via the base budget to 
circumvent the budget caps limitations (Williams & Epstein, 2017). Policy-makers would 
be expected to refine the BCA guidelines to address the recurrent need to increase the 
spending limits to address the present needs. Under the guise of reducing future deficit, 
these budget practices allowed both the president and Congress high levels of flexibility 
but lacked any semblance of discipline or any other principles of sound budgeting.  
Still, with no guidelines on what could or could not be designated as an 
“emergency” Congress had the freedom to designate almost anything they deem an 
“emergency” as such. Congress technically could remain within the budget by placing 
what belonged in the base budget into the OCO account to provide extra funding for 
defense (Hale, 2016). The lack of restraint provoked policy-makers to further take 
advantage and make compromises among the principles to push their own agenda in the 
budget (Candreva, 2017). Many argued the budgeting practices used by Congress and the 
president were necessary to provide adequate funding for defense requirements for war-
related contingency operations while others criticized legislatures actions as a budgetary 
“gimmick” that “undermined the integrity of the budget process” (National Security 
Network, 2014; see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15. Sound Budgeting Principles as Applied to The Deficit 
Control Period (2012–2016). 
C. CONCLUSION 
As expected when budgeting for a contingency, the emphasis will normally shift 
towards flexibility as policy-makers strive to act during a time of crisis (Candreva & 
Jones, 2005, p. 4). But, the nature of emergencies is such that policy-makers often 
compromise other principles like reliable information and legitimacy to adequately fund 
the immediate requirement. To deal with that, governments tend to shift the definition of 
what constitutes such an emergency. For instance, the definition of an emergency at the 
beginning of a war reflects the true nature of an emergency as designated by Congress. 
But later, as the emergency evolves or concludes, policy-makers find ways to circumvent 
or change policy or definitions to make the situation conform to allow for budgeting as 
they see fit (Williams & Epstein, 2017). While too much flexibility and too little restraint 
engenders corruption, too little flexibility and too much restraint builds rigidities and 
inhibits innovation and change (OECD, 2014). Comprehensiveness and transparency are 
essential for effective aggregate fiscal discipline and formal rules that are designed to 
achieve aggregate fiscal discipline create incentives for evasion, particularly to take 
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activities off-budget or to engage in creative accounting (OECD, 2014). Below is the 
application of the sound budgeting principles as seen through varying budgeting practices 
during (2001–2016; see Table 2). 
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     Table 2 illustrates the evolution of how the sound budgeting principles during (2001–2016) were 
applied to the varying budgeting practices within five distinct periods during that time.  
 
During the DERF period (2001–2003), there was a lot of flexibility given by 
granting the DOD autonomy to make budget decisions, with few restrictions on the 
DOD’s delegatory budget authority. Due to the unforseen circumstances of the attacks of 
9/11, there were low levels of predictability, transparency, information, and legitmacy as 
expected when budgeting for contingency operations. Discipline was compromised for 
high levels of flexibility which prompted Congress to search for a new way to fund 
contingency operations that would still provide flexibility; but, increased the level of 
discipline.  
During the IFF period (2003–2005), the war in Afghanistan and Iraq evolved, and 
Congress ceased using the DERF in exchange for the IFF. The IFF reduced flexibility 
within an acceptable amount so that the budgeting practices still allowed Congress to 
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delegate budget authority with a high degree of autonomy to make decisions about 
resource allocation. It also implemented discipline by imposing restrictions on the use of 
appropriations funds to fund contingency operations in support of the Global War on 
Terror, improving transparency and information. 
As time elapsed and the War on Terror continued, the administration began to use 
budgeting practices that demonstrated loyalty to to the cause of war rather than 
emphasizing fiscal responsibility. By that, the Bush administration began to take 
advantage of the vague policy guidelines of the IFF implemented by Congress. As the 
tension grew between Congress and the executive branch, there was little focus given to 
using budgeting practices that were in keeping with the principles of sound budgeting, 
resulting in low levels of all but one sound budgeting principle, flexibility. 
In 2009, the president and Congress changed the way OCO funds were provided 
and appropriated for; concurrently, a new regime strived to reinstate the principles of 
sound public budgeting into the budget practices dealing with OCO funding by 
establishing a fiscal policy that promoted fiscal responsibility. The changes had a positive 
impact on the budgeting practices during Obama’s first years (2009–2011). It would be 
the first and only time that budgeting practices exemplified high levels of both flexibility 
and discipline simultaneously. Additionally, there were high levels of predictability and 
an increase from low level to medium level in both transparency and legitimacy. The new 
OCO mechanism proved to revert budgeting practices back into the direction of sound 
budgeting. 
However, in 2011, President Obama signed the BCA into law after the federal 
statute was first enacted by Congress to control the deficit, thus imposing greater 
restrictions to the budget process, forcing Congress to use creative budgeting practices to 
adequately fund program requirements for defense programs. These practices reduced the 
legitimacy of funding as Congress deliberately appropriated funds with the intentions of 
later moving them to the base budget, to circumvent triggering sequestration by 
exceeding the set limits of the budget caps. Discipline has two elements, process and 
amount. The BCA added discipline to the latter but was written in a way where it was 
possible to cheat on the margins. Congress used budgeting practices to flaunt the rules, 
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resulting in a low level of budget discipline regarding the process. Congress traded the 
application of the transparency principle for greater applications of predictability because 
the limitations of the BCA motivated policy-makers to compromise other funding 
priorities to adequately fund the DOD for war-time activities in support of the Global 
War on Terror, reflecting an understanding in the DOD’s need for program requirements.  
Following the 9/11 terror attacks, the United States was considered to be in a state 
of emergency but since then, the military operation in support of the Global War on 
Terror no longer qualify under the definition of an “emergency.” Additionally, the term 
contingency operations has been generally applied to all military operations since 2001 
that deal with the Global War on Terror and that have received funds via supplemental 
appropriations, which are usually reserved for “emergencies.” The general use of these 
terms and budgeting practices that involved “emergency,” “contingency operation,” or 
“supplemental appropriations” have falsely made the three terms seem interchangeable. 
As time evolved, so have the definitions of these terms; consequently, so did the 
budgeting practices. In the following chapter I analyze those changes and provide a 
summary of my findings, make a recommendation, and provide suggestions for further 















The base budget for defense accounts for costs associated with training, manning, 
and equipping the military during peacetime but neglects to appropriate funds for war-
related activities, support, and equipment. There is no argument that the terrorist attacks 
on 9/11 qualified as an emergency or that the use of supplemental funds was appropriate 
for the circumstance in 2001. However, after 15 years, classifying OCO as an 
“emergency,” specially to avoid deficit reduction targets, fails to keep with the principles 
of sound public budgeting. While compromises are necessary to support efforts during 
times of crisis, there is a point in which contingencies can no longer be defined as an 
“emergency,” in which case budgeting practices should normalize.  
The goal of this project was to answer the following question: As budgeting and 
appropriation practices for contingency operations evolved, to what extent were they 
consistent with the principles of sound public budgeting? Chapter II described the budget 
process as it should work in such situations, Chapter III described the actual events from 
2001–2016, and Chapter IV compared those actual events to the idea through the lens of 
the principles of effective public budgeting. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This study revealed that budgeting practices for contingency operations in both 
the executive branch and Congress have evolved significantly over the past 15 years and 
when the practices changed, policy-makers did not always rationalize the change in the 
terms of adhering to good budgeting principles, but often to advance their own agenda.  
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the government did what was expected. 
Because good information did not exist, needs were not predictable, and flexibility was 
necessary for an effective response, the administration sought and Congress provided 
funds with a lot of flexibility through a much-abbreviated process. Within a couple of 
years, Congress began reverting to more normal budgeting processes by reducing 
flexibility, but the administration had learned to appreciate those freedoms and sought 
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even more. This had the unintended consequence of slowing down the appropriations 
process, and eroding some of the discipline that Congress was attempting to inject. 
By funding the contingencies in supplemental appropriations, the Bush 
administration was able to concentrate attention on the cost of war (increasing 
transparency), and assuring that funds were appropriated in a timelier fashion than 
through the slower, regular budget process (adding flexibility). These practices came at 
the cost of predictability because of the ad hoc nature of the requests and good 
information because the long-term costs of war-related funding were not considered in 
the regular base budget. At the same time, we see Congress using the supplemental 
appropriations for non-defense purposes. These appropriations were considered “must 
pass” and became favorite targets for adding provisions unrelated to the war, eroding 
legitimacy and process discipline.  
Throughout this period, the boundary between what was considered war-related 
and what was a base requirement changed, depending on who the key decision-makers 
were and their objectives. The definitions varied and the border between the two budgets 
was porous. While this is evidence of flexibility, it is not a healthy flexibility because it 
came at the cost of transparency, reliable information, and predictability. It shows a lack 
of budget process discipline. 
The Obama administration attempted to restore some of that process discipline by 
aligning the budget calendar, requesting OCO funds at the same time as base budget 
requirements. They also added a modest amount of predictability and transparency by 
including out-year placeholders in the budget. At this point, the overseas contingencies 
were hardly emergencies and could be funded on a more predictable basis. But with 
concerns about the deficit changing budgeting practices, the desires of the military (and 
their supporters in Congress) led them to take advantage of the emergency exception to 
the budget caps, eroding budget discipline with respect to both process and amount, while 
also eroding transparency and good budget information. This process was also less 
predictable as it depended on Congress’s willingness to cheat. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
It is now possible to theorize on what occurred. Shortly after the crisis, budget 
behavior compromised sound budgeting principles in a way that matched the ideal 
expectation: flexibility and timeliness were paramount and other principles were 
compromised because they were unattainable in the moment. As events became more 
predictable, Congress began to restore its power of the purse, and the administration 
resisted because of the many advantages of enhanced flexibility. Where policy-makers’ 
expectations could be met by compromising sound budgeting principles, they attempted 
to do so unless the political cost was too high. At times, others within the system could 
exert checks and balances. With a change in administration, newfound discipline was 
interjected until that discipline affected policy goals and then the discipline was 
compromised again. 
Funding ongoing military contingency operations overseas is a recurring issue for 
Congress. Future Congresses will debate whether funding contingency operations should 
be provided for in a supplemental appropriation through an “emergency” account or 
whether it should be a part of the regular base budget for defense provided for through 
annual request. Congresses will always balance the public’s desire for sound budgeting 
practices with more immediate policy goals that pressure policy-makers to compromise 
some of those practices. 
Similarly, because the DOD currently does not budget for contingencies, but 
ironically exists to conduct contingency operations, there is a constant dissonance 
between what the DOD is supposed to do and what it actually does when budgeting. The 
discussion of where OCO appropriations belong, whether in the base or a separate OCO 
account, is clouded by vague definitions of understanding with regard to the terms 
associated with an emergency, a contingency operation, and a supplemental 
appropriation, as well as understanding the difference between defense and overseas war 
funding, as there is currently no distinction. The issues remain unsettled, and probably 
will be for some time. 
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“An important starting point is to identify which level of decision making is best 
served by either more or less flexibility and then build in transparency and accountability 
mechanisms to restrain the level of flexibility” (OECD, 2014, p. 24). The need for a 
proper framework that supports funding for contingency operations exists. There is a 
foundation upon which the proper application of the sound budgeting principles can be 
balanced with budgeting practices to ensure that funding contingencies support the 
overall objectives of the budgeting system. I recommend the president, Congress, and 
other federal agencies consider the budgeting practices over the last 15 years as a guide 
for future application of the sound budgeting principles when budgeting for contingency 
operations. Because contingency operations are not synonymous with an “emergency,” 
the DOD should consider revising the FMR to allow for budgeting for contingency 
operations, whether included in the base or via a separate appropriation. The budgeting 
system thrives when each of the sound budgeting principles are applied to the budgeting 
practices appropriately throughout the budgeting process. I urge that the president, 
Congress, and the federal agencies improve their internal processes which they plan for 
and program based on fulfilling a requirement to achieve their objectives. Congruent 
efforts in the beginning parts of the process can increase the chances for a successful 
budget execution. As the budgeting process is an iterative process, I encourage all 
participants to continually reassess budgeting processes and readapt by learning from past 
occurrences to improve future practices and strengthen the foundation on which the 
budgeting framework was built.   
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis covered only the period immediately following the terrorist attacks in 
2001 until 2016. There are three suggestions for further research. 
The first suggestion is to broaden the scope of this thesis by continuing this 
research through the Trump administration to evaluate the applications of the sound 
budgeting principles to the budgeting practices in funding contingency operations 
continuing to FY17 and beyond. 
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The second suggestion is to evaluate the application of the sound budgeting 
principles using all 10 principles of sound budgeting instead of the six used in this study 
to determine other deviations from the normal budgeting practices when budgeting for 
contingencies. 
Lastly, I suggest digging deeper into the motivations that guided policy-makers to 
rationalize their changes, whether in the terms of the principles of sound budgeting or 
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